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Challenging Pregnancy Discrimination
in Drug Treatment: Does the ADAMHA
Reorganization Act Provide an Answer?
Alys I. Cohent
Why should anyone have to be like white men to get what they have,
given that white men do not have to be like anyone except each other
to have it?1
INTRODUCTION
Cleo Washington was seven months pregnant with her second child when
she was forced to leave drug treatment; the city had cut the program from its
budget. This was Washington's third attempt to seek treatment during her
pregnancy. Initially, she tried acupuncture, but left the program because she
was afraid that the needles might be infected and was offended by the drug
dealers gathering just outside the door. Next, she attended a coed program,
which placed men, women, and children in the same room during therapy. Her
city caseworker then referred her to a special program for mothers and
pregnant women. Three weeks later, it closed. Frustrated, Washington decided
not to seek out a fourth program although she knew state authorities might
place her children in foster care. "'I'll just stay home,' she said, 'I don't want
the aggravation of starting over.' "2
The story of Cleo Washington is not unique. Across the country, pregnant
women face major obstacles when seeking treatment for their drug dependence.
Many are denied access to programs simply because they are pregnant.3 Some
of those who do find treatment must resort to clinics that do not sufficiently
meet their needs.4
As one response to this crisis,5 Congress recently passed the ADAMHA
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1. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1287
(1991).
2. Anemona Hartocollis, Doors Closing For Young Mom Fighting Drugs, NEWSDAY, June 28, 1991,
at 34. These New York City budget cuts were projected to result in the exclusion of 9,200 drug addicts,
mostly women, from treatment. See id.
3. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of constitutional avenues for challenging pregnancy discrimination in drug treatment
programs, see generally Megan R. Golden, Note, When Pregnancy Discrimination is Gender
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(Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration) Reorganization
Act.6 This legislation, which restructures programs first created by the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,' expands block grants provided
to states for drug treatment programs' and targets a portion of this funding
for addressing the particular needs of pregnant drug-addicted women.
ADAMHA programs focusing on pregnant drug-addicted women include
specific grants for residential and outpatient treatment of pregnant and
postpartum women9  and increased set-asides for pregnant women."°
Moreover, ADAMHA requires that states give preference to pregnant women
in admission to substance abuse treatment facilities and, where admission is
not available, that states provide interim services within forty-eight hours."
The Act also underwrites the federal share of costs of home visits to pregnant
women at risk of delivering infants with "health or developmental
complication[s]" 2 and mandates research regarding medications to treat
drug-addicted pregnant women safely. 13
In addition to initiating the affirmative steps discussed above, Congress also
inserted a revised provision explicitly prohibiting pregnancy discrimination by
recipients of federal funds. 4 The addition of this pregnancy discrimination
Discrimination: The Constitutionality of Excluding Pregnant Women From Drug Treatment Programs, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1832 (1991) (arguing that pregnancy discrimination in drug-treatment programs is
prohibited directly under the Constitution). State and municipal laws, such as public accommodation
statutes, may also provide relief. Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993)
(challenge to the exclusion of pregnant women from drug-treatment programs under New York public
accommodations law).
6. Pub. L. No. 102-321, 106 Stat. 323 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A §§
201-300 (West Supp. 1993)). Because alcoholism among pregnant women raises somewhat different
concerns, including detoxification safety, see 1 COMM. FOR THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE COVERAGE STUDY,
DIv. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED., TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS 234 (Dean R. Gerstein &
Henrick J. Harwood eds., 1990) [hereinafter TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS], and does not bring with it the
same social stigma as the use of illegal substances, this article will only address the statute's effect on
drug-addicted women. The statute, however, also addresses treatment for alcohol abuse.
7. 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
8. Most public programs receive ADAMHA funding. Telephone Interview with Ripley Forbes, Senior
Staff Associate, House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment (Jan. 5, 1993).
9. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 290bb-1,2 (West Supp. 1993).
10. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-22 (West Supp. 1993).
11. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-27 (West Supp. 1993). If a particular program can not accommodate
a pregnant woman, the burden shifts to the state to find an alternative location or to provide her with the
interim services. Id. Interim services are defined as "services for reducing the adverse health effects of
[substance] abuse, for promoting the health of the individual, and for reducing the risk of transmission of
disease, which services are provided until the individual is admitted to such a program." 42 U.S.C.A. §
300x-64 (West Supp. 1993).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 280c-6 (West Supp. 1993). The federal share of costs "may not exceed 90
percent." Id.
13. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 285o-4 (West Supp. 1993).
14. "No person shall on the ground of sex (including, in the case of a woman, on the ground that the
woman is pregnant) . . . be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any program or activity funded in whole or in part with funds made available" under
the block grant provisions. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-57(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993). The former version of the
provision proscribed sex discrimination but did not include pregnancy within that definition. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300x-7(a)(2) (1988). This change is particularly important in light of the Supreme Court's holding in
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 496 n.20 (explaining that an insurance
Pregnancy Discrimination
clause is vital; it offers more immediate and more expansive relief than the
new programs created by ADAMHA. t5 Under this provision, pregnant
women can gain access to already-existing drug treatment programs, rather
than awaiting the establishment of new ones. Moreover, the pregnancy
discrimination clause expands the number of women who will benefit from the
statute. While the new programs created by the statute will help only a limited
number of women, due both to the finite nature of new funding and to the lag
time between the provision of grants and the creation of new treatment options,
the nondiscrimination provision offers access to treatment slots in all programs
receiving ADAMHA funding.
This article will explore the parameters of the ADAMHA nondiscrimination
provision and the ways in which it responds to the crisis of drug addiction
among pregnant women. 6 Part I will examine the background against which
Congress passed the new law, focusing on the extent of drug dependence
among pregnant women, the inaccessibility of appropriate treatment for both
women in general and pregnant women in particular, and the potential harms
to pregnant women and their fetuses due to continued drug use. Part II will
explore punitive and coercive responses by state and local governments to the
problem of drug dependence among pregnant women, examine the costs of
such approaches, and argue that the need for such drastic measures would be
reduced by expanding treatment options. Part HI will look at whether the new
ADAMHA nondiscrimination provision can be privately enforced. More
specifically, it will undertake the following inquiries: Can a plaintiff bring a
private suit directly under the statute or as a § 1983 action? Who are the
potential defendants? What are the available remedies? Part IV will examine
the substantive standards that courts should apply in interpreting the ADAMHA
provision, including the availability of affirmative defenses. Because no case
has yet been adjudicated under ADAMHA's nondiscrimination provision, this
article will use relevant statutory and common law to propose a paradigm for
approaching such cases in the future.
I. THE CONTOURS OF THE PROBLEM
Drug use among pregnant women has reached significant proportions, yet
many pregnant women do not receive the drug treatment they need. This
plan that excluded pregnancy benefits did not constitute sex discrimination because it merely "divides
potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons"). Thus, when Congress
intends to alter that definition for the purposes of a statute, it must do so explicitly in order to leave no
room for debate. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (defining sex discrimination to include pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
15. The progress effectuated by these new programs should not be underestimated. While they are
important steps toward meeting the particular needs of pregnant women, their beneficial impact will emerge
on a long-term basis.
16. This article focuses on how ADAMHA's nondiscrimination clause would be utilized in litigation.
The possibility for judicial enforcement, however, also provides a tool for applying pressure in the political
and regulatory arenas.
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problem is part of a more general marginalization of the needs of women
addicts. As a result, many pregnant women face continued addiction-wreaking
havoc on their health and the well-being of their fetuses. This picture provides
the backdrop against which Congress passed the ADAMHA Reorganization
Act.
A. The Extent of Drug Use Among Pregnant Women and the Inaccessibility
of Treatment
Nationwide, pregnant drug-addicted 7 women give birth to 375,000 babies
each year."5 Yet, a survey of nineteen hospitals in fifteen cities indicated that
in two-thirds of the cases, hospitals could not refer drug-addicted pregnant
women for treatment. 9 Estimates of the number of drug-exposed infants born
annually in New York City range between 700020 and 10,000.21 A recent
survey, however, showed that 54% of the outpatient treatment programs in
New York City categorically excluded pregnant women, 67 % did not provide
services to pregnant women on Medicaid, and 87% denied treatment to
pregnant women on Medicaid who used crack.22 Further, twenty-two of the
twenty-six state-funded residential programs in New York City do not admit
pregnant women.'
Pregnant drug-addicted women across the country face similar obstacles
in seeking treatment. In Philadelphia, for example, one study showed that
16.3% of all babies born in Philadelphia that year had been exposed to
24cocaine. Yet, a recent survey of area programs revealed that fourteen
clinics, most of which receive public funding, categorically excluded pregnant
women, and six additional programs placed severe restrictions' on pregnant
women that effectively barred most of them.26 In Washington D.C.,
17. The medical community defines addiction as "a biological, social, and psychological response to
a drug, most usefully compared to a chronic illness in which relapse can be anticipated." Wendy Chavkin,
Workshop on Public Policy Considerations, 67 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 301, 301 (1991).
18. See Tamar Lewin, Drug Use in Pregnancy: New Issue for the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990,
at A14.
19. Michelle Harrison, Drug Addiction in Pregnancy: The Interface of Science. Emotion, and Social
Policy, 8 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 261, 264 (1991).
20. Sarah L. Krauss, Pregnant Cocaine Addicts Facing Harsher Sentences in the Courts, N.Y. L.J.,
May 1, 1992, at S-10.
21. Hartocollis, supra note 2, at 34.
22. Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
483, 485 (1990).
23. Clara Hemphill, Programs forAddicts Stalled, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1990, at 8. In 1989, New York
City attempted to implement a five-year plan to create 21,000 treatment slots, many of which would be
for pregnant and postpartum women. See Carol Polsky, Crack in Family Portrait, NEWSDAY, Nov. 5, 1989,
at 6. This plan was slowed down, however, by bureaucratic delays and internal local government disputes.
See Hemphill, supra, at 8.
24. David Zucchino, Women's Group Seeks Probe at Health Centers, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 1992,
at B2.
25. Id. The restrictions generally relate to the stage of a woman's pregnancy or to her medical
insurance.
26. See id. The Philadelphia Human Relations Commission is investigating these allegations. This is
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approximately 2000 drug-exposed babies are born each year, but as of 1990
there were no inpatient treatment programs that focused on the needs of
pregnant women.' On the opposite coast, an estimated 80,000 drug-exposed
infants are born annually in California,28 yet treatment options do not meet
the existing need.29
No matter where they live, pregnant women are often turned away from
treatment programs simply because they are pregnant.3° Timely admittance
to drug treatment is especially vital for pregnant women because the fetus is
most vulnerable to damage from drug use during the first trimester.3" The
need for treatment, however, remains urgent throughout pregnancy.
3 2
The major justifications for excluding pregnant women offered by drug
treatment programs are based on medical concerns. Programs assert that they
do not have the resources safely to meet the special needs of pregnant
the second complaint of such discrimination filed in the country. In New York, the ACLU is challenging
the exclusion of pregnant women from two hospital-based programs. See Plaintiffs' Complaint at 1, Elaine
W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (No. 90-6230) [hereinafter Plaintiffs'
Complaint].
27. Elsa Walsh, D.C. Report Blasts Focus of Drug War, WASH. POST, May 10, 1990, at BI, B7.
28. Philip Hager, Case Sparks Debate Over Fetal Murder, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1992, at BI.
29. See id.
30. See Marty Jessup, The Treatment of Perinatal Addiction: Identification, Intervention, and
Advocacy, 152 W. J. MED. 553 (1990). Advocates for these women assert that there is no justification
for such blanket exclusions on the basis of pregnancy. One advocate explained,
There is no medical reason why they should not be in treatment with others. There is a phobia
of pregnancy, an unnecessary fear of pregnancy. . . . No one is asking them to provide any
more medical care for a pregnant woman than they would for hepatitis, heart disease, or any
other common ailment .... Their job is to treat the substance abuse, and there is a full network
of prenatal-care providers ... who can provide prenatal care.
Marianne Costantinou & Robin Palley, No Rehabfor Pregnant Addicts?, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27,
1992, at 11 (quoting Carol Tracy, Executive Director of the Women's Law Project).
31. See Jessup, supra note 30, at 554.
32. See Chavkin, supra note 22, at 483. One series of studies showed that "up to 25 percent of all
pregnant women receiving medical assistance Health Pass who come to the University of Pennsylvania have
used cocaine within 24-48 hours of delivery." Hearing Before Philadelphia Comm'n on Human Relations
139 (Jan. 10, 1994) (statement of Dr. Arnold Cohen, Director of Maternal Health, University of
Pennsylvania) [hereinafter Statement of Dr. Arnold Cohen] (on file with the Yale Journal of Law and
Feminism). While not all of these women would seek treatment if available, some would enter programs.
The shortage of treatment slots for pregnant women discourages those women who otherwise would seek
help. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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women.33 They are also concerned with liability for harming the fetus.34
These justifications, however, are not supported by the facts and the law.3"
B. The Broader Context: The Shortage of Appropriate Treatment for Women
The lack of access to treatment for pregnant women is best understood as
part of the general scarcity of appropriate treatment programs for women.36
This problem can be traced to two main causes: the shortage of drug treatment
programs that accept women and the inability of programs that do accept
women to address their spectrum of needs.37 Historically, the drug treatment
community has neglected the needs of women addicts.3" Many of the
programs were developed to treat men only.39 "Conservative estimates
indicate that women represent 33 % of those in need of treatment, yet a national
survey indicates that 80% of the treatment resources are used by men.'
For women who gain admission to drug treatment programs, there still is
no guarantee that their needs will be adequately met. Because the drug
treatment system was initially created for men, rehabilitation approaches often
do not take into account women's different social roles. Furthermore, drug
treatment programs often do not provide medical and social services, which
33. See discussion infra part IV.B. 1. Historically, distinguishing women from men on the basis of
biological differences has led to the legal, social, and economic subordination of women. See, e.g.,
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding statute prohibiting women from working as bartenders
unless supervised by their husbands or fathers), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23
(1976); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage statute only for
women); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (upholding statute prohibiting women from working
in restaurants in large cities at night); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (justifying maximum
hour laws for women only on the grounds that "woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence"); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life .... The paramount
destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother."), overruled
by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2831 (1992). For a more recent example, see Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977) (upholding state regulation that prevents women prison guards
from serving in "contact" positions due to the likelihood that inmates would sexually assault them because
they are women).
34. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
35. For a discussion on why these defenses fail, see discussion infra part IV.B.
36. It is important to note that this problem is itself part of a larger shortage of drug treatment slots
nationwide. See, e.g., Celestine Bohlen, Dinkins Urges More Financing of Drug Centers, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1989, at B2; John J. Goldman, Neglected Weapon in Drug War, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1990, at
Al; Julie Mason, Dispute Threatens Closure of Drug-Treatment Center, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 26, 1992,
at Al. In the context of this shortage, however, pregnant women are disproportionately affected. For
example, currently in South Carolina there are no drug treatment programs that accept pregnant women.
See Philip J. Hilts, Hospital is Accused of Illegal Drug Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at A12. On
a nationwide basis, Medicaid coverage does not adequately cover drug treatment for pregnant women.
See Law and Policy Affecting Addicted Women and Their Children: Hearings Before the House Select
Comm. on Children, Youth and Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 105-110 (1990) (Prepared Statement of
David Gates, Staff Attorney, National Health Law Program).
37. See discussion infra part I.B. 1-2.
38. See Chavkin, supra note 22, at 485.
39. Id.
40. Carol E. Tracy & Harriet C. Williams, Social Consequences of Substance Abuse Among Pregnant
and Parenting Women, 20 PEDIATRIC ANNALS 548, 550 (1991).
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are an essential part of treating drug-addicted pregnant women. These failings
have a particularly detrimental effect on pregnant women, because their needs
are greater than nonpregnant women in both of these respects.
The neglect or omission of women's needs from drug treatment programs
may be attributed to a number of factors. Because programs were initially
created by and for men, they were run from a male-centered perspective. As
a result, the drug treatment community felt that accommodation of women's
needs would involve the provision of additional, i.e. "extra," systems and
services. Where women's needs are seen as supplemental (rather than as part
of the baseline for measuring sufficient services), efforts to address them are
mired in the "debate about whether [women] are getting more or not
enough." 4" This, in turn, allows women's concerns to be dismissed, or
delegitimized, as requests for "perks."4 2
Of course, our society and the drug treatment community marginalize the
treatment needs of pregnant drug-addicted women in ways that are not
applicable to all of these women. Our society stigmatizes pregnant drug addicts
and often blames them for their addiction and for the harm they cause their
fetuses.4' This stigma is based, in part, on the belief that certain women, due
to their race and class, are not worthy of bearing children and becoming
mothers." Thus, the drug treatment community often sees pregnant addicts
as unworthy of accommodation in drug treatment programs. These societal
judgments and instances of neglect, however, should be rejected and the biases
in the drug treatment delivery should be addressed in order to create a more
equitable system.
1. Gender Issues in Drug Treatment Approaches
Because substance abuse programs were initially developed to treat men,
many of the approaches currently employed do not target women's needs.4'
41. Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment
Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc: CHANGE 325, 367 (1984-85).
42. A discussion of the particular needs of women-and of pregnant women-implicates a much larger
debate about how social and biological distinctions should be addressed by the law. "When we identify
one thing as like the others, we are not merely classifying the world; we are investing particular
classifications with consequences .... [Wle use our language to exclude, to distinguish-to discriminate."
MARTHA MINOw, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw 3 (1990).
For a range of views on how pregnancy should be viewed in social, political, and legal contexts, see
generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987) (advocating paradigm for
law of sex discrimination which focuses on eliminating dominance); Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist
Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981) (advocating a "difference" model); Williams, supra note 41
(endorsing an "equal treatment" approach that incorporates both male and female needs in an
"androgynous" prototype). These analyses may help inform the transformation of drug treatment programs
to address the needs of pregnant women.
43. See infra part II.A. (discussing the phenomenon of blaming pregnant women for their addiction).
44. This perspective may also animate the use of punitive measures against women who use drugs
during pregnancy. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1440-41 (1991).
45. This phenomenon is part of a larger problem in the medical community. Women's needs generally
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Women addicts, especially pregnant women, face particularly harsh social
stigma.' They are more likely to have low self-esteem47 and to suffer abuse.
In one study, seventy percent of drug-addicted pregnant women said they had
been the victims of physical abuse as adults.48 Treatment regimens must be
altered to address the particular needs of female clients, especially pregnant
women.
"Therapy for women should ... be provided in a style that is acceptable
to and accessible by them, taking into account 'women's roles, socialization,
and relative status within the larger culture.'" '49 Traditional treatment models,
which are confrontational and punitive, are less likely to meet women's
needs."0 "Confrontational models reinforce low self-esteem," inhibiting a
client's ability to overcome her addiction and take on economic and social
responsibilities." Mothers and pregnant women in treatment do not benefit
from traditional approaches because these methods "are oriented toward
helping clients develop a sense of self independent of those around them. "52
Treatment programs must help pregnant women address personal issues
relating to childbirth, such as "parenting, bonding, neonatal withdrawal [and]
guilt."" Programs that include the needs of the family unit will be more
likely to meet these women's needs.5 4 Without transformations in the drug
have been overlooked in the field of medical research. Most research has been conducted on male subjects,
thus creating a scarcity of treatments and medical instruments designed for women. See Tamar Lewin,
Doctors Consider a Specialty Focusing on Women's Health, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1992, at 1. In some
cases, the actual definitions of illness have been based only upon men's symptoms. For example, until
1992 "the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention based the definition of AIDS entirely on men,
ignoring the symptoms and diseases that typically appear in HIV-positive women. As a result, women with
AIDS could not get the public assistance available to male patients." Id. at 10; see also Federal Old-Age,
Survivor's, and Disability Insurance, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,008 (1993) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt.
P, App. 1) (revised regulations regarding disability benefits for HIV-related impairments). For a discussion
of gender issues in medical research, see generally Sue V. Rosser, Re-visioning Clinical Research: Gender
and the Ethics of Experimental Design, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 127-36 (Helen
B. Holmes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992) (examining the problems of "androcentric" medical research
and identifying some benefits of eliminating such bias).
46. See Jessup, supra note 30, at 553.
47. See Peter Applebome, U.S. Prisons Challenged By Women Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1992, at A10.
48. Carol Tracy et al., Women, Babies & Drugs: Family Centered Treatment Options 9 (1990)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism) (citing D.O. Regan et al.,
Infants of Drug Addicts: At Risk for Child Abuse, Neglect and Placement In Foster Care, 9
NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 315, 315-319 (1987)). Seventy percent of addicted pregnant women
were beaten as adults. Of these, 86% were beaten by husbands or partners. Id.; see also Edwin
Chamberlain, Differences Abound in Male, Female Users, U.S. JOURNAL, June 1988, at 7 (discussing
differences between male and female addicts in their physical abuse histories).
49. Jessup, supra note 30, at 553 (quoting B.G. Reed, Developing Women-Sensitive Drug Dependence
Treatment Services: Why So Difficult?, 19 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 151, 151-64 (1987)).
50. Tracy & Williams, supra note 40, at 550.
51. Id. In cases where women will complete treatment and face family responsibilities, an emphasis
in treatment on developing independence will not prepare them for this reality. On a broader level, some
feminist theorists have argued that women generally are more connected to others, while men are more
focused on individuality. For an elaborate discussion of this "connection thesis," see generally Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
52. Tracy & Williams, supra note 40, at 550.
53. Polsky, supra note 23.
54. Tracy & Williams, supra note 40, at 550.
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treatment delivery system related to women's socialization and family
responsibilities, women will not have "meaningful" 55 access to drug
rehabilitation.56
2. The Need for Comprehensive Treatment Services
Drug abuse generally is part of a larger social context.57 Treatment
programs, in addition to targeting women's specific needs in overcoming
addiction, should provide comprehensive medical care and social services to
address other problems of drug-addicted pregnant women. Provision of these
services improves the treatment outcomes of the women, and, in the case of
pregnant women, of their newborns.58
Child care is one of the most important services that treatment programs
can provide to postpartum women and other mothers. Most mothers will not
remain in drug treatment unless there are on-site provisions for their
children.59  Women who attend residential treatment programs that
accommodate their children are generally less depressed than women who must
place their children with relatives or in foster care.6° Yet, most programs
currently do not accommodate children. In California, only sixteen of the sixty-
seven publicly funded drug treatment programs that treat women also provide
child care.61 In New York City, only two of the eighty-seven programs
accommodate children.62 The number of family-centered programs must be
expanded.
Treatment services for pregnant women should also include: obstetric and
pediatric care,63 childbirth preparation classes, 64 AIDS prevention counseling
and treatment, 65 and "job and educational training," including "ongoing
involvement after delivery, with an emphasis on child development and
55. The Court in Lau v. Nichols stated that Chinese American students who did not speak English
and had been offered an education without English language classes were "effectively foreclosed from any
meaningful education." Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974). Analogously, in the provision of drug
treatment services, perhaps it could be argued that treatment in a "language" that one does not
understand-i.e., male-centered approaches to recovery-constitutes sex discrimination. Whether the present
Court would accept such an argument is questionable.
56. Where women in treatment will be sharing family responsibilities with a partner, a comprehensive
service delivery system also should assist the partners in becoming involved in these issues.
57. Harrison, supra note 19, at 263.
58. See Chavkin, supra note 22, at 485; Jessup, supra note 30, at 553; Loretta P. Finnegan et al.,
Scientific Foundation of Clinical Practice: Opiate Use in Pregnant Women, 6 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED.
223, 238 (1991).
59. See TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 234.
60. See Tracy & Williams, supra note 40, at 551-52.
61. See Tracy et al., supra note 48, at 6.
62. See id. See also Polsky, supra note 23 (discussing a Bronx program where after childbirth women
must find outside care for their children or place them in foster care to stay in treatment).
63. Jessup, supra note 30, at 553.
64. Id.
65. See Finnegan et al., supra note 58, at 228.
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parenting skills." 6 6 Providing comprehensive services at one location is
important because "[o]therwise, many addicts who have a hard time getting
their lives together must travel around to get the care they need. Frequently
something falls by the wayside. "
67
The neglect of women's needs in treatment sets the backdrop for the
exclusion of pregnant women from these programs. Male-oriented programs
marginalize women's needs and banish the plight of pregnant drug-addicted
women to the bottom of society's priorities. Focusing attention on the needs
of women addicts6 will give all women better chances for recovery and will
transform treatment for pregnant women into a fundamental aim rather than
a peripheral concern.
C. When Pregnant Women are Turned Away from Treatment: The Effects of
Substance Abuse Upon Pregnant Women and Their Fetuses
Although pregnant women may face many challenges after entering drug
treatment, the primary problem of those seeking help remains exclusion from
treatment programs. A major consequence of denying pregnant women
treatment is that their continued drug use adversely affects their health and the
well-being of their fetuses. 69 Further, the exclusion of pregnant women from
66. Chavkin, supra note 22, at 485. One example of a program that provides these services is the
Family Center at Thomas Jefferson Hospital in Philadelphia. See Finnegan et al., supra note 58, at 228.
Some states, such as New York, are beginning to provide integrated drug treatment and social services.
See Polsky, supra note 23. The National Commission to Prevent Infant Mortality has also issued a report
recommending that local government agencies provide a "one-stop shopping" system for all pregnant
women, to centralize services for Medicaid, AFDC, immunizations, and prenatal care. Death by Red Tape,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 19, 1991, § 4, at 16.
67. Polsky, supra note 23.
68. In addition to the services discussed above, initial outreach also presents an opportunity for
focusing on women's perspectives. Consideration of women's varying psychological, physical, and social-
service needs may lead to more effective outreach to female drug users.
69. For a detailed analysis of the effects of drug use on pregnant women and their fetuses, see
generally Par 111: Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, in DRUGS AND PREGNANCY 341, 367-423 (Larry
C. Gilstrap III and Bertis B. Little eds., 1992) (discussing effects of alcohol, amphetamines, marijuana,
cocaine, hallucinogens, opiates, inhalants and other substances). Although many studies seem to show the
harmful effects of drug use upon the fetus, it is still unclear whether improved pregnancy outcomes of
addicted women who enter treatment primarily stem from a decrease in drug use or an increase in prenatal
care. See Harrison, supra note 19, at 263. Solving this dilemma is made especially difficult because
research showing that drug use has little effect on the fetus tends to be published far less than research
demonstrating a positive correlation. For example, a recent report indicated that studies finding a connection
between cocaine use and poor pregnancy outcome had a much greater chance of being accepted for
presentation at a national conference than those finding no connection, even where the latter were better
designed. See Gideon Koren et al., Bias Against the Null Hypothesis: The Reproductive Hazards of
Cocaine, LANCET, Dec. 16, 1989, at 1440; see also Katha Pollitt, Fetal Rights: A New Assault on
Feminism, NATION, Mar. 26, 1990, at 409, 414. The news media also tend to give prominence to studies
finding strong connections between women's drug use and pregnancy outcome, whereas those finding no
connection, or those documenting the effects of a father's drug use, receive little or no coverage. See id.
at 414. "Published literature therefore does not represent a cross-section of knowledge, but rather only
that type of data acceptable within the community of editors of medical journals." Harrison, supra note
19, at 263. Despite this ambiguity, drug treatment is still urgently needed to address the addiction of the
women themselves. Because drug use is generally positively correlated with lack of prenatal care, see id.,
increased availability of treatment will positively affect birth outcomes.
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drug treatment creates great social costs because the children of women who
use drugs during pregnancy often experience educational and social
problems.7°
Pregnant women who use drugs during pregnancy often are susceptible to
increased medical problems. Pregnant drug-addicted women are at a higher
risk for sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, gonorrhea, syphilis, and
herpes.7" They are also more likely to suffer from "poor nutrition, disruption
of the menstrual cycle, hepatitis, adult-onset diabetes and hypertension." 72
The pregnant woman's drug use may also harm the fetus. The fetus is most
likely to develop congenital defects from drug exposure during the first
trimester, particularly during the first fifty-eight days after conception. 73 At
that time, many women do not yet know they are pregnant. Drug use during
the second two trimesters also brings a risk of harming the fetus.7' For
example, the effects of daily marijuana use on the fetus during pregnancy
include premature birth, higher chance of birth defects, and low birth
weight.75 The incidence of early labor and stillbirth also increases with the
amount of marijuana use, and heavy intake may affect central nervous system
development in the fetus.76
Cocaine use brings greater risks than marijuana to the health of the fetus,
including low birth weight, 7 stillbirth,78 spontaneous abortion,7 9 preterm
labor,0 and impairment of neurological development."' Prolonged use of
heroin by pregnant women produces adverse effects on fetal growth, behavior,
perception, "learning processes," language, and organizational abilities in
preschool age children. 2
Greater access to treatment through enforcement of ADAMHA's
nondiscrimination provision could prevent many of these harms. By entering
70. See HUMAN RESOURCES DIvmsION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. HRD-90-138, DRUG
EXPOSED INFANTS: A GENERATION AT RISK 6 (1990).
71. See Finnegan et al., supra note 58, at 229; see also Bertis B. Little et al., Introduction to
Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, in DRUGS AND PREGNANCY, supra note 69, at 341, 344 (noting that
pregnant substance abusers are at increased risk for sexually-transmitted diseases, poor nutrition, and
bacterial endocarditis); TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 85 (noting that pregnant drug-addicted
women are at a greater risk for infection with HIV, malnutrition, and trauma).
72. Tracy et al., supra note 48, at 9. Drug-addicted women who frequently use needles often "have
abscesses, ulcers, thrombophlebitis, bacterial endocarditis,..., and urinary tract infection." Finnegan et
al., supra note 58, at 229.
73. See Little et al., supra note 71, at 341.
74. See id.
75. See DRUG SAFETY IN PREGNANCY 68-69 (Peter I. Folb & M.N. Graham Dukes eds., 1990).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 69. Nationwide, African-American infants are twice as likely as white babies to die before
age one, usually due to low birth weight. See Death by Red Tape, supra note 66.
78. See DRUG SAFETY IN PREGNANCY, supra note 75, at 69.
79. Judith A. Ney et al., The Prevalence of Substance Abuse in Patients with Suspected Preterm Labor,
162 AM. J. OBsTET. & GYNECOL. 1562, 1565 (1990).
80. Luke B. Sloan et al., Substance Abuse During Pregnancy in a Rural Population, 79 OBSTET. &
GYNECOL. 245, 246 (1992).
81. Id.
82. DRUG SAFETY IN PREGNANCY, supra note 75, at 69.
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treatment, pregnant drug-addicted women would improve their own health as
well as that of their fetuses. They would also receive prenatal care, thus
ensuring better pregnancy outcomes. Further, these improved pregnancy
outcomes would save public monies. Children of drug-addicted women who
receive treatment during pregnancy would be less likely to suffer from
educational and social difficulties.
II. DANGERS OF CURRENT APPROACHES
Although state and local governments have responded to the crisis of drug
abuse among pregnant women by making some effort to meet the need and
demand for treatment, 3 many have also instituted punitive and coercive
measures." The primary punitive and coercive means for addressing the
problem of drug abuse among pregnant women include prosecuting the women
directly, utilizing preventive detention, and removing custody of their
newborns and other children. 5
Punitive and coercive responses to drug abuse among pregnant women
warrant particular concern because they disproportionately affect poor women
and women of color.8 6 For example, a recent study in Florida showed that
while percentages of drug use did not differ greatly between women attending
public clinics and those at private offices, or between white women and
African American women, heath care providers were much more likely to
report poor women and African American women to state health authorities. 7
In fact, providers were almost ten times more likely to report African
American women than white women. 8
Most notably, prosecutions brought against pregnant, drug-addicted women
target poor women of color. In one ACLU study, over half of the defendants
83. See, e.g., Rob Karwath, Helping Babies of Abusers to Be Born Drug-Free, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 25,
1990, at CI (discussing two new programs in Chicago).
84. Coercive state-sponsored measures have also been used against women to prevent pregnancy.
Women who face charges of child abuse have been forced to undergo Norplant birth control insertions to
prevent them from having more children. See generally Elyse Rosenblum, The Irony of Norplant, 1 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 275 (1992).
85. See generally Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 278
(1990).
86. For a more in depth discussion of the racial implications of punishing pregnant women for drug
use, see generally Roberts, supra note 44. Court-ordered caesareans also have a disparate impact on women
of color. A study profiling women subject to involuntary caesareans ("court-ordered obstetrical
interventions") showed that "81% of the women were Black, Hispanic, or Asian, 44% were unmarried,
and 24% did not speak English as their primary language." Harrison, supra note 19, at 265 (citation
omitted).
87. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and
Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1204
(1990).
88. Id. While it could be argued that this disparity can be traced to the fact that Black women more
often used cocaine while white women more often used marijuana, id., the choice to punish certain forms
of substance abuse over others is an initial decision that deserves to be questioned. For example, alcohol
abuse, while legal, can cause great damage to a fetus.
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surveyed were African American. 9  Recent national publicity about
prosecutions in South Carolina revealed that over forty pregnant women in that
state-almost all African American-had been tested for drug use without their
consent and then arrested. 90
These punitive responses to drug abuse by poor women of color raise
significant issues. This disparate treatment on the basis of race implicates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection and the protections of other civil
rights laws.9" From a policy perspective, rather than targeting poor women
and women of color, governments should seek less coercive solutions, such
as facilitating access to treatment rather than punishing pregnant drug-addicted
women in an adversarial legal system. 92 Expanded treatment options, such
as those now available under ADAMHA, present a better alternative: they can
help pregnant women overcome addiction while preserving their liberty and
keeping their families together.93
A. Prosecution
Jennifer Johnson was the first woman in the United States to be convicted
for drug use during pregnancy. 94 Johnson, an African American woman, was
convicted of delivering cocaine to a minor-through the umbilical cord95-and
sentenced to 14 years probation. 96 Significantly, prior to her arrest, Johnson
89. See Roberts, supra note 44, at 1421 n.6.
90. Philip J. Hilts, Hospital is Object of Rights Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994, at 29. These
revelations came to light amidst allegations that these women also were the unknowing subjects of human
experimentation. Hilts, supra note 36, at A12.
91. See Golden, supra note 5, at 1834-35; Philip J. Hilts, supra note 90, at 29.
92. See Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Binhs Without Sacrificing Women's
Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 573-79 (1992) (contrasting coercive government measures with
"facilitative" methods).
93. The issue becomes more difficult with regard to those who have not sought treatment and who
would not be receptive to outreach efforts. While expanding treatment availability itself will not help these
women or their babies, punitive measures are still problematic.
First, they particularly affect poor women and women of color. See supra notes 85-92 and
accompanying text. Additionally, society chooses to punish pregnant drug-addicted women because it blames
them for their addiction. One commentator observed:
As with crime, as with poverty, a complicated, multifaceted problem is construed as a matter
of freely chosen individual behavior. We have crime because we have lots of bad people, poverty
because we have lots of lazy people . . . or lots of pathological people . . . and tiny, sickly,
impaired babies because we have lots of women who just don't give a damn.
Pollitt, supra note 69, at 411. Some point to the media as an important contributor to this phenomenon
of blaming women. See SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
427 (1991). Rather than blame the victims, society should seek to address these problems as part of their
larger socio-economic context. For a more detailed analysis of alternatives to punishment, See Stephen R.
Kandall & Wendy Chavkin, IllicitDrugs in America: History, Impact on Women and Infants, and Treatment
Strategiesfor Women, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 615,638-43 (1992) (criticizing punitive approaches and advocating
alternative measures, including increasing treatment availability, drug legalization, and expanding the
involvement of child protection authorities).
94. Tamar Lewin, Court in Florida Upholds Conviction For Drug Delivery by Umbilical Cord, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1991, at 6.
95. See Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming trial court's
convictions).
96. Lewin, supra note 94.
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had unsuccessfully attempted to seek treatment.97 Although Johnson's
conviction was overturned by the Florida Supreme Court,98 at least 200
women nationwide have faced criminal charges for using alcohol or drugs
during pregnancy." Efforts to bring such prosecutions continue."
Prosecutions have found many supporters and opponents. Some
law-enforcement officials view prosecutions of pregnant drug-addicted women
as a means of encouraging women to seek treatment.1 1 In Greenville, South
Carolina, for example, the city solicitor claimed that since the city started
prosecuting pregnant women under child neglect laws, the number of arrests
had decreased because hospitals were identifying fewer cocaine babies. The
solicitor said there was no evidence that women were avoiding prenatal care
or hospital deliveries to avoid arrest.0 2
This claim, however, should be challenged. Prosecuting pregnant women
does cause them to avoid seeking drug treatment and prenatal care because
many pregnant drug-addicted women opt to stay out of the public eye rather
than seek medical care and face possible criminal charges. 10 3 This, in turn,
leads to an increase in babies born without medical attention." Therefore,
prosecutions may harm rather than improve the health of pregnant women and
their fetuses.0 5
97. Lewin, supra note 18.
98. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1291 (Fla. 1992). The court noted that
no other jurisdiction has upheld a conviction of a mother for delivery of a controlled substance
to an infant through either the umbilical cord or an in utero transmission . . . . The Court
declines the State's invitation to walk down a path that the law, public policy, reason and
common sense forbid it to tread.
Id. at 1297. After the Johnson decision, the South Carolina Court of Appeals followed suit in the case of
Rosena Tolliver, stating that the South Carolina legislature had not intended the state's drug laws to be
used against pregnant women. See Alison B. Marshall, 1992 Legislative Review, PERINATAL ADDICTION
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION UPDATE, Oct. 1992, at 1, 3. Criminal prosecutions for delivery of drugs to
a minor also have failed in North Carolina and Massachusetts, see Lewin, supra note 94, and in Michigan,
Ohio, New York, and Kentucky, see Marshall, supra, at 3.
99. See Krauss, supra note 20, at S-10. Seventy-five percent of these prosecutions have been against
women of color. See id. at n.9. For example, Melanie Green, a 24-year-old woman in Illinois, was the
first woman in the nation to face charges of manslaughter for the death of a child allegedly caused by her
drug use during pregnancy. The charges were later dropped when the grand jury refused to indict her.
See Walter B. Connolly and Alison B. Marshall, Drug Addiction, Pregnancy and Childbirth: Legal Issues
for the Medical and Social Services Communities, in CENTER ON CILDREN AND THE LAW, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEIR FAMILES: COORDINATING RESPONSES OF THE
LEGAL, MEDICAL AND CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM 31 (1990). Other theories of prosecution have included
"charges of child endangerment, supplying drugs to children and assault with a deadly weapon." Hager,
supra note 28.
100. See, e.g., Hager, supra note 28.
101. See Lewin, supra note 18.
102. Id.
103. See Board of Trustees, American Medical Association, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy:
Court Ordered Medical Treatment and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant
Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990); Lewin, supra note 94.
104. Susan LaCroix, Birth of a Bad Idea: Jailing Mothers for Drug Abuse, NATION, May 1, 1989,
at 586.
105. In addition, health care providers, see Harrison, supra note 19, at 265, and groups opposing
legalized abortion, see Krauss, supra note 20, at S-10, fear that criminal charges will force women into
having abortions.
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Nevertheless, there is significant public support for punishing pregnant
women whose actions may harm their newborns. Nearly half of those surveyed
in a recent poll said that a pregnant woman who smokes cigarettes, drinks
alcohol, or rejects her doctor's recommendation to have a caesarean section
should be held legally responsible for any damage to the fetus. 1" But when
considering measures that restrict liberty, particularly that of individuals who
do not have a strong voice in the political process, courts should be wary of
majoritarian consensus. 7 The majority may not be sensitive to the race and
class implications of prosecuting pregnant women. Such measures may also
lead to significant line-drawing problems. For example, some advocates have
wondered if women could be prosecuted for poor eating or exercise habits,"10
driving, skiing,"° or not following a doctor's orders1 during pregnancy.
In fact, one case was brought against a woman for not following her doctor's
advice, although the charges were eventually dismissed.111
In addition to being prosecuted for becoming pregnant while addicted,
pregnant drug-addicted women often are "'preventively detained' by judges
who mete out jail sentences for minor crimes that would ordinarily result in
probation or a fine . . "12 For example, in United States v. Vaughn,"3
Brenda Vaughn pled guilty to second degree theft, a charge that usually brings
a sentence of probation. 4 The judge, however, had ordered a drug test in
conjunction with the sentencing proceeding, and when Vaughn tested positive
for cocaine, he explicitly stated that he was sending her to prison long enough
to prevent her from using drugs again during her pregnancy.115 Although
sentencing always includes a broad range of considerations about the
defendant, preventive detention involves incarcerating women simply to prevent
drug use during pregnancy (not the crime for which they have been convicted)
rather than utilizing drug use as one factor to inform the sentencing process.
106. See LaCroix, supra note 104, at 586.
107. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
108. See Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives
AfterWebster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 192 (1989) (noting that if state law defined legal personhood from
the moment of conception, women could be prosecuted for failing to eat well).
109. See Dean S. Miller, Idaho Governor Hit for Plan to Jail Pregnant Drug Users, CHRISTIAN SI.
MONITOR, Jan. 24, 1991, at 8.
110. See Hager, supra note 28.
111. See LaCroix, supra note 104, at 585. Pamela Stewart was arrested for not following her doctor's
advice, which included recommendations to rest, refrain from intercourse, refrain from using illegal drugs,
and seek medical treatment if she experienced complications with the pregnancy. Id.
Stewart's husband, who had heard the doctor's advice, ignored it all and beat his wife into the
bargain. Everything she did, he did-they had sex together, smoked pot together, delayed getting
to the hospital together-but he was not charged with a crime, not even with wife-beating,
although no one can say that his assaults were not a contributing cause of the infant's injury and
death.
Pollitt, supra note 69, at 416.
112. Pollitt, supra note 69, at 409.
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Preventive detention, then, serves as a covert means of punishing pregnant
women.
While preventive detention has not attracted the same attention as
prosecution, it raises similar concerns. In both scenarios, women face the
possibility of restricted liberty, a disproportionate (and unjust) result for those
who would have entered treatment had it been available. Direct prosecutions
deter women from seeking the medical care they need. Those women who
remain hidden and thus do not face the threat of losing their liberty instead
endanger their health and the well-being of their fetuses. This result runs
counter to the goal of promoting healthy pregnancies. Expanding drug
treatment options for pregnant women under ADAMHA offers a less coercive
and healthier alternative for those who will seek drug treatment.
B. Child Protection
Many states have addressed the problem of drug abuse among pregnant
women by denying them custody of their newborn infants. For example, soon
after Shawn S., one of the plaintiffs in Elaine W v. Joint Diseases North
General Hospital, discovered she was pregnant, she called or visited at least
five drug treatment programs, seeking to cure her crack addiction. Each
program refused to admit her. Without treatment, Shawn was unable to stop
using crack. During delivery, worried that her crack use might jeopardize the
health of her newborn, she informed hospital personnel about her addiction.
When her daughter Thelma was born, the hospital gave her a drug test.
Because of Thelma's positive toxicology, the hospital refused to release Thelma
to her mother." 6 If Shawn S. could have found drug treatment during her
pregnancy, she probably would not have lost custody of her daughter. While
dependency proceedings may be required in extreme circumstances," 7
increasing the availability of treatment would reduce the need for this
practice. "'
The prospect of a less restrictive alternative is especially important because
denying custody to postpartum drug-addicted women presents a number of
problems. In some cases children are removed from their mothers based on
one drug test, even where subsequent tests have not shown any drug use and
where there have been no other indications of a drug problem." 9 Further,
116. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 26, at 11-12.
117. Even those who oppose a blanket practice of denying custody acknowledge the importance of
social service involvement in some cases. See Barbara Whitaker, Protecting Baby from Mom, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 6, 1989, at 8.
118. Many on both sides of the debate about the use of dependency proceedings against drug-addicted
women agree that treatment is the best solution. LaCroix, supra note 104, at 586-88.
119. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 85, at 289-90; Whitaker, supra note 117, at 8. New York City's
official policy requires investigations prior to removals of whether mothers are seeking treatment and have
a support network. One family law attorney, however, characterized the city's practice as "grab now, ask




an increasing number of jurisdictions, while not instituting neglect or
dependency proceedings, temporarily remove children after birth until an
assessment of parental fitness can be performed. These temporary measures
are undertaken without any prior individualized analysis of the child's family
situation. 2 °
More importantly, removing a newborn at birth threatens to damage
permanently the parent-child relationship. "Mhe separation of mother and
child could destroy what psychologists and social workers agree is a critical
bonding period, causing emotional and psychological damage to the infant and
feelings of overwhelming guilt and depression in the mother." 121 If treatment
were more widely available, a greater number of families could remain
together. 122 The denial of custody also burdens the social welfare system.
In a study of ten hospitals nationwide, approximately 1200 of the 4000
drug-exposed infants born were placed in foster care, at an annual cost of $7.2
million. " Social welfare mechanisms could function more efficiently and
consume fewer tax dollars if the problem of drug-exposed infants was
addressed prior to their birth.
III. A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: ENFORCING ADAMHA's
NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISION
In an effort to expand treatment availability for pregnant women, Congress
passed ADAMHA's revised nondiscrimination provision, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in federally funded drug treatment
programs. 124 The enforcement of this new provision will allow more women
to gain entrance to treatment, thus reducing the use of punitive measures. The
provision's explicit enforcement mechanisms, however, are circumscribed. The
statute provides that where there has been a finding of noncompliance, notice
requesting compliance must be provided to the state. 1" If compliance is not
secured "within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 60 days," a number
of routes may be pursued. 12 6 The matter may be referred to the Attorney
General, who in turn may institute a federal civil action "for such relief as may
be appropriate, including injunctive relief."127 Additionally, because
120. Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return to
Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745, 752 n.25 (1990).
121. LaCroix, supra note 104, at 586.
122. Even child protection authorities acknowledge the importance of keeping families together where
such an option is possible. For example, authorities in New York City have expanded efforts to "'case
manage' drug using women during pregnancy, thus hoping to reduce family disruption." Kandall &
Chavkin, supra note 93, at 633 (quoting Joseph B. Treaster, Plan Lets Addicted Mothers Take Their
Newborns Home, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 1991, at Al).
123. HuMAN REsouRcEs DIvisIoN, supra note 70, at 7.
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-57 (West Supp. 1993).
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ADAMHA recipients are subject to four other civil rights statutes, remedies
under these statutes may be available where noncompliance is found. Finally,
the Attorney General may take "other actions as may be authorized by
law."128 Thus, enforcement of ADAMHA's nondiscrimination provision is
overtly limited to action by the Attorney General; private causes of action are
not expressly granted.
Remedial schemes, however, are not always restricted by a literal reading
of the statute. Private rights of action may be implied even when they are not
expressly provided for in the statute. Therefore, in examining the ability of
the nondiscrimination provision to help pregnant women seek treatment, it must
be determined whether women can bring suit under the statute to enforce their
rights or whether they must rely on government enforcement mechanisms. A
related issue is whether pregnant women can enforce their rights by bringing
a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.29 A § 1983 suit offers the
possibility of securing attorney's fees for the plaintiffs, 3 ' thus enabling
actions to go forward that otherwise may not have been brought. Additionally,
potential defendants and available remedies must be identified. This Section
will explore these issues, examining the choices that plaintiffs may face in the
process of enforcing their rights and recommending particular legal avenues
for maximizing the effect of ADAMHA's nondiscrimination provision.
A. Is There a Private Right of Action Under the Statute?
The nondiscrimination provision of the ADAMHA Reorganization Act does
not explicitly provide for private enforcement. Thus, individuals seeking to
bring an action under the statute must show that a court should imply such a
remedy. In Cort v. Ash,131 the Supreme Court first set out the test for
determining whether a private cause of action should be implied under a
federal statute. The Cort analysis asked four questions:
First ... does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
128. Id.
129. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The question of whether there is an implied right of action turns on the definition
of "and laws."
130. Id. § 1988.
131. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
[Vol. 6: 91
Pregnancy Discrimination
a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?132
Soon after establishing this test, however, the Court began to prioritize
some elements over others, ultimately focusing on the question of
congressional intent. In Touche Ross and Company v. Redington,"' the Court
considered whether customers of securities brokerage firms could bring a
private action against accountants who allegedly made improper audits of an
insolvent firm under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In
declining to apply all four Cort factors, Justice Rehnquist explained that the
criteria were not meant to be granted equal weight. Rather, "[t]he central
inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by
implication, a private cause of action."134 Applying the first three Cort
factors, Justice Rehnquist found that the statutory language did not grant a
private action, that the intent of the statute was only to regulate businesses (not
to create private rights), that the legislative history was silent on the question
of private remedies, and that statutory provisions surrounding the one in
question, by contrast, did explicitly allow for private actions. 135 Accordingly,
Rehnquist held that no private cause of action should be granted.
Two years later, in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union of
America, 36 the Court underlined its focus on congressional intent by noting
that the inquiry must end where neither of the first two Cort factors are
satisfied. 137 In Northwest, the petitioner had previously been held liable for
sex discrimination under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII and was seeking
contribution from union signatories to the labor agreement. In denying a
private right to contribution, the Court found that neither the language nor
structure of the statutes, nor their legislative histories, supported the notion
that Congress intended to provide such a remedy.'38 The congressional intent
analysis was dispositive.
Justice Marshall reaffirmed the use of the congressional intent standard for
implied causes of action in Thompson v. Thompson.139 In denying a private
remedy to a parent seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding
conflicting state child custody orders, the Court asserted that congressional
intent was the "essential predicate" for implying an action."4 Specifically,
132. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
133. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
134. Id. at 575.
135. Id. at 569-72.
136. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
137. Id. at 94 n.31.
138. Id. at 92-95.
139. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
140. Id. at 179.
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in examining the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, the Court looked at
three elements demonstrative of congressional intent: context, language, and
legislative history. 141
The Court's evolving interpretation of Cort indicates that whether private
actions under the ADAMHA nondiscrimination provision will be recognized
turns on an analysis of congressional intent. This analysis must focus on the
first two Cort factors and examine the purpose, language, and structure of the
statute, as well as the historical context in which the statute was passed.
The first Cort factor, whether the statute was meant to benefit the putative
plaintiff, is satisfied where the provision in question either confers a right on
private parties or prohibits particular conduct.' 42 The nondiscrimination
provision of the ADAMHA Reorganization Act easily satisfies this test. The
language of the statute focuses on the rights conferred upon individuals not to
be "excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under, any program or activity funded" with ADAMHA
block grant monies.' 43 In granting this right to private parties, the law clearly
proscribes discrimination by treatment programs receiving ADAMHA
grants. 144
In discussing the second Cort factor, congressional intent to create or deny
a private remedy, the Court has pointed out that as a practical matter "the
legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private
remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question. ""'
Thus, "the failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not
inevitably inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy
available. Such an intent may appear implicitly in the language or structure
of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment.'" Therefore, these
factors-statutory language, statutory structure, and historical context-should
be examined in determining whether Congress intended to grant a private
remedy.
The language and structure of a statute disallow a private action only where
Congress has created a complex remedial scheme. The Court has held that
141. Id. at 180.
142. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 300x-57(a) (West Supp. 1993).
144. In California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), the Court explained that the first Cort element
is not met where the plaintiffs only benefit indirectly from the statute. Cort requires that "Congress
intended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries." Id. at 294 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 690-93 n. 13 (1979)). In Sierra Club, the plaintiffs brought an action under a federal statute
that prohibited the obstruction of navigable waterways. The language of the statute did not point to
particular beneficiaries, but rather stated "a general proscription of certain activities." Sierra Club, Id. at
294. Thus, while the plaintiffs did in fact benefit from unobstructed waterways, there was no evidence that
Congress had created the law for the benefit of the plaintiffs. This dilemma does not present itself under
the ADAMHA provision. ADAMHA creates a direct benefit to the plaintiffs-freedom from
discrimination-rather than the indirect benefit created by the Sierra Club statute.
145. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 (citation omitted).
146. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 18; see Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179.
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such a detailed scheme indicates that Congress intended to delineate the full
scope of available remedies under a statute and that the Court is therefore
bound by the articulated remedies.'47 ADAMHA's nondiscrimination
provision does not provide such a comprehensive remedial scheme. Although
it generally empowers the Attorney General to enforce the statute,' 48 it does
not explicitly allow for private individuals to enforce their rights. ADAMHA's
general provision stands in contrast with the detailed remedies that foreclosed
private rights of action in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union of
America and Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal Employees. The
statute at issue in Northwest allowed for "private enforcement in certain
carefully defined circumstances, and provide[d] for enforcement at the instance
of the Federal Government in other circumstances."149 Similarly, the statute
at issue in Karahalios offered judicial access in only three circumstances." 0
Because ADAMHA does not include such a detailed remedial scheme,
Congress apparently did not intend to provide the full scope of available
remedies. Rather, Congress intended the courts to allow private actions.
The circumstances surrounding a statute's enactment provide an additional
source of guidance under the second Cort factor. This inquiry contains two
parts: an analysis of the legislative history of the statute itself and an
examination of the context in which it was enacted.'' As discussed above,
when a statute is silent on the subject of private remedies, it is not surprising
that the legislative history will be equally silent. Thus, legislative history must
serve as a source of implicit support for a private right of action." 2
While the legislative history of the ADAMHA Reorganization Act does not
discuss private enforcement, it does focus on the treatment crisis among
pregnant, drug-addicted women. It specifically acknowledges that blanket
exclusions of pregnant women must end. For example, Senators Bob Graham
147. See Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989); Northwest Airlines
v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93-95 (1981).
148. See 42 U.S.C.A § 300x-57 (West Supp. 1993).
149. Northwest, 451 U.S. at 93.
150. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 532.
151. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988).
152. The majority in Thompson explained,
Our focus on congressional intent does not mean that we require evidence that Members of
Congress, in enacting the statute, actually had in mind the creation of a private cause of action.
The implied cause of action doctrine would be a virtual dead letter were it limited to correcting
drafting errors when Congress simply forgot to codify its evident intention to provide a cause
of action.
Id. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia disputed this point, stating that while congressional intent must not
be explicitly declared, subjective intent is required and may be "inferred from various indicia." Id. at 189
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's disagreement indicates his more general discomfort with implying
rights of action from federal statutes. Focusing on the importance of separation of powers, Justice Scalia
said that he would eliminate the Court's role in implying private remedies and instead would rely on
Congress. He cited three reasons for deferring to Congress: Congress' power under Article III to determine
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Congress' role in defining the reach of its own legislation, and
Congress' ability to create a private right of action when it chooses to do so. Id. at 191-92 (citing Cannon
v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)). For now, Justice Scalia's approach
remains a minority view.
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and Connie Mack described to the U.S. Senate the pressing need in Florida
for treatment of pregnant, addicted women. Senator Graham noted that "[o]nly
1,500 of the 10,000 pregnant women in Florida in need of treatment receive
services. "153 Senator Mack then explained, "The human element of this
legislation is immeasurable. . . what I am really arguing for is access to the
system for the 21-year-old crack cocaine-addicted pregnant woman who
statistics say will more than likely have additional substance exposed newborns
if she does not get treatment. "154
Similarly, on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Representative Richard Durbin declared:
Unfortunately, many of our Nation's residential treatment programs
currently refuse to serve pregnant women or refuse to make provision
for their children. As a result, pregnant women who desperately need
treatment languish on the waiting lists for the few programs that are
available. While they look for a program that has an opening and will
accept them, they and their children suffer the continuing effects of
their addiction.' 5
Clearly, the crisis of drug abuse among pregnant women informed
Congress' passage of the ADAMHA Reorganization Act. While this evidence
alone may not be enough to warrant a private remedy, it lends support to the
congressional intent argument. As the Court has pointed out, a statute without
an explicit grant of private remedies often has legislative history that is silent
on the issue. Thus, a focus by individual members of Congress on the urgency
of the problem and the plight of individual members of society may be the only
evidence available in the legislative history.
In such circumstances, the context in which Congress has acted in passing
a statute may prove especially useful in discerning congressional intent. This
is particularly true where the Court, prior to the law's enactment, has found
a private right of action under similar legislation.' When Congress enacted
the nondiscrimination provision of the ADAMHA Reorganization Act, it did
so against the background of four civil rights statutes containing almost
identical language. Thus, an examination of the availability of private rights
of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI),' 57 Title
153. 138 CONG. REC. S7651 (daily ed. July 1, 1992) (statement of Sen. Graham).
154. Id. (statement of Sen. Mack).
155. Id. at H5708 (statement of Rep. Durbin).
156. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 189-90 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that context should be
relevant in the determination of intent only when interpreting related legislation or the same legislation prior
to its reenactment); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring)(noting Congress' silence at the time of enactment of similar legislation as a reliance on the
Court to decide whether a private right of action should exist).
157. "No person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
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IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX),15 § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1975 (§ 504),""9 and the Age Discrimination Act of
1975 (Age Discrimination Act)t1 -which proscribe various types of
discrimination by recipients of federal funding-informs the analysis of private
remedies for pregnancy discrimination under ADAMHA.
These four statutes are especially appropriate for analyzing the ADAMHA
nondiscrimination provision for several reasons. First, they all contain language
similar to that in ADAMHA and therefore seem to require similar interpretive
approaches. Second, like ADAMHA, they all pertain to federally funded
programs and thus operate with similar assumptions about the relationship
between funding recipients and the respective funding agency. Third,
ADAMHA's section on nondiscrimination includes a provision affirming the
applicability of these four statutes to recipients of ADAMHA block grants, 61
implying similar types of obligations. Finally, the four statutes are treated
together in the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, 62 which allows
damage remedies in suits against states, suggesting their comparable remedial
schemes.
An examination of private rights of action under the four analogous civil
rights statutes begins with the test initially set forth by the Supreme Court in
a Title IX case. In Cannon v. University of Chicago,63 a female plaintiff
sued two universities for sex discrimination in their medical school admittance
procedures. The Supreme Court held that a private cause of action existed
under Title IX. In reaching that conclusion, the Court applied the four-part
Cort test. 64 It found that the statute was enacted for the benefit of the
plaintiff, as she was claiming to be a victim of the discrimination explicitly
proscribed by Title IX.16' The Court also found that Congress clearly
intended to create a private cause of action. Justice Stevens explained that Title
IX was modeled on Title VI, with the assumption that it would be interpreted
similarly. Because lower federal courts had already construed Title VI to allow
a private remedy at the time Title IX was passed, Congress believed Title IX
would include a private action. 166 The Court also observed that granting a
private remedy would effectuate the legislative purpose of protecting
158. "No person ...shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance. . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
159. "No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. .. ." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
160. "[N]o person . . . shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1988).
161. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-57(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988).
163. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
164. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688.
165. See id. at 689-94.
166. See id. at 694-703.
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individuals from discrimination. 167 Finally, the court found that allowing such
a remedy would not intrude upon a traditional area of state concern, since
anti-discrimination laws were well established as within the purview of the
federal government. 16 After applying the Cort test, Justice Stevens stated
that concerns regarding the cost and volume of private actions did not override
the Court's conclusion that Title IX provides a private remedy.
69
Although the Court in Cannon relied on the four-part Cort test rather than
the revised test which focuses solely on congressional intent, 70 both
Congress and the Supreme Court have since affirmed Cannon's holding.
Congress' first action that indicated approval of Cannon was the Civil Rights
Remedies Equalization Act (CRREA). The 1986 amendment to the
Rehabilitation Act abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from
damages under Title IX, Title VI, § 504, and the Age Discrimination Act. 1 '
By allowing private individuals to recover damages from the states, Congress
impliedly approved of actions by private plaintiffs. In Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 172 the Supreme Court underlined this interpretation
of Congress' intent with regard to private remedies under Title IX. It noted
that the CRREA "cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon's
holding. ""' "This is not a situation, then, where the correctness of [the]
Court's statutory interpretation is supported only by congressional
acquiescence. Rather, Congress here has enacted legislation strongly indicating
the correctness of [the] Court's decision." 74 Further, a second piece of
federal legislation also indicates congressional approval of Cannon. When
Congress passed the more recent Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987," Ts
it did not take this opportunity to limit implied causes of action. In fact, many
of the judicial decisions discussed in the legislative history of the Act were
private actions. 76 Thus, Cannon's holding that a private right of action exists
under Title IX remains good law.
Relying in part on its holding in Cannon, the Court has also found private
causes of action under Title VI and § 504. In the Court's first Title VI case,
167. See id. at 703-08.
168. See id. at 708-09.
169. See id. at 709-10.
170. For a discussion of the evolution of the Corr test, see supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
171. A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation
of section 794 of Title 29, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 ... title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting
discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
172. 112 S.Ct. 1028 (1992).
173. Id. at 1036; see also id. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring).
174. Brief of National Women's Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 8,
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs. Dist., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) (No. 90-918).
175. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
176. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, 14-16 (1987).
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Lau v. Nichols,'" the Court adjudicated a class action suit by
Chinese-American students against the San Francisco school district for
unequal educational opportunities. The Court decided the case without
addressing the question of whether there was a private right of action, thus
implying that one existed. Four years later, in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,' where a white male applicant challenged the
affirmative action admissions policies of a state medical school, four Justices
found that there was a private cause of action, 79 and four more explicitly
assumed that one existed.8 ° In its most recent Title VI decision, Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York,' the Court relied on
both Bakke and Cannon to articulate explicitly a private right of action. The
Guardians court explained that in Cannon, "[a] major part of the analysis was
that Title IX had been derived from Title VI, that Congress understood that
private remedies were available under Title VI, and that Congress intended
similar remedies to be available under Title IX."182 Because the language
of ADAMHA's nondiscrimination provision is modeled upon these two
statutes, the same reasoning can and should be applied to private causes of
action under ADAMHA.
The Court's discussions of private causes of action under § 504 have been
much briefer. In the Court's first § 504 decision, Southeastern Community
College v. Davis,'83 the Court arrived at the merits of the case without
addressing whether there was a private cause of action.' The following
year, in a suit against a railroad employer alleging discrimination on the basis
of a disability, the Court, relying on its earlier Title VI analysis, held that a
private cause of action existed under § 504."s Subsequently, the Court
reached the merits of a class action suit in Alexander v. Choate,'86 in which
Medicaid recipients challenged a state's reduction of the number of days of
inpatient hospital care covered under its Medicaid program, without addressing
the question of whether there was an implied right of action.
177. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
178. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
179. Id. at 418-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. See id. at 283 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). One Justice found no cause of action but seemed to indicate that he may have accepted a § 1983
action. See id. at 380-81, 387 (opinion of White, J.); see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n
of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 594 n. 17 (1983) (opinion of White, J.) (discussing Justice White's approach
in Bakke).
181. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
182. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 594 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-703); see also id. at 635-36
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
184. Id. at 404 n.5.
185. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 626 (1984). Because the defendant abandoned
its claim that there was no private right of action under § 504, the Court did not address this point
explicitly. Id. at 630 n.7.
186. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of private
remedies under the Age Discrimination Act, a number of federal district courts
have explored the issue. One district court found no private right of action,'87
although it did so without any accompanying analysis. 8 Subsequently,
however, "all courts . . . that have faced the issue have resolved it in favor
of a private cause of action."189 Thus, when Congress passed the recent
ADAMHA Reorganization Act, private causes of action were available under
the Age Discrimination Act, Title VI, § 504, and Title IX, all of which contain
nondiscrimination provisions similar to that in ADAMHA. Accordingly, courts
should recognize an implied private cause of action under ADAMHA.
A comparison with the four civil rights statutes also demonstrates that the
ADAMHA enforcement provision vesting power in the U.S. Attorney General
does not preclude a private right of action. As discussed above, ADAMHA
explicitly grants power to the Attorney General to enforce its nondiscrimination
provision. ' ° Similarly, pursuant to an Executive Order,' 9 ' the Attorney
General has the power to coordinate the enforcement of Title VI, Title IX, and
§ 504 and any federal statutes that prohibit discrimination in federally assisted
programs, 92 such as ADAMHA. Since the Attorney General's enforcement
power has in no way limited the availability of private remedies under the three
civil rights statutes,'93 the same should be true of ADAMHA. An analysis
of the Age Discrimination Act offers a similar conclusion. While the Attorney
General's role in enforcing the Age Discrimination Act has been established
in the statute itself, 94 this has not been cited as any cause for hesitation in
implying private rights of action.
Finally, a brief overview of the four analogous civil rights statutes indicates
that ADAMHA should not require private plaintiffs to exhaust administrative
remedies, such as hearings before executive-branch agencies and related
appeals, before pursuing private actions. 95 Of the four statutes, the Supreme
187. Mittelstaedt v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ark., 487 F. Supp. 960, 965 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
188. Id.
189. Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (E.D. Pa. 1990). See NAACP v. Wilmington
Medical Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 293 n. 12 (D. Del. 1980) (assumed without deciding that there was
a private right of action under the Age Discrimination Act), aff'd sub non., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981)
(en banc); Stephanidis v. Yale Univ., 652 F. Supp. 110, 112 n.* (D. Conn. 1986), (questioning the holding
in Mittelstaedt), aff'd mer., 814 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1987).
190. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
191. See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988).
192. The order allows the Attorney General to enforce
[any other provision of Federal statutory law which provides, in whole or in part, that no person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, national origin, handicap, religion, or
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Id. § 1-201(d).
193. See supra notes 165-87 and accompanying text.
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e)(1) (implying a role for the Attorney General by requiring that private
plaintiffs provide notice to her before bringing an action).
195. This inquiry provides the only source of information on this question, because, as with the subject




Court has found that administrative exhaustion is required by the Age
Discrimination Act only, where the requirement is explicitly provided for in
the statute.196 By contrast, the Court has entertained § 504 and Title VI cases
without requiring administrative exhaustion.' 97 Because ADAMHA, like Title
VI, Title IX and § 504, does not provide explicitly for exhaustion, private
plaintiffs should be able to gain direct access to federal court.
As the above discussion illustrates, courts should recognize a private
remedy under ADAMHA's nondiscrimination clause. A careful analysis of the
legislative history, historical context, and close relationship to other civil rights
statutes reveals that ADAMHA meets the first two Cort factors and their focus
on congressional intent. Therefore, an implied right of action exists under
ADAMHA.
B. Is There a Private Right of Action Under § 1983?
Rather than seeking a private remedy directly under the statute, a plaintiff
might want to bring an action against the state or a state actor under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983198 because it allows her to recover attorney's fees.1 99 Further,
should a court find that private actions are not available under ADAMHA, §
1983 still provides a means of bringing a case in federal court because the test
for determining whether there is a private cause of action under § 1983 differs
from that applied directly under the statute. One disadvantage of bringing a
case under § 1983 is that potential defendants must be state actors. 200 While
a public hospital or treatment program will be subject to suit as a state actor,
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 6104(0; see also 45 C.F.R. § 90.50 (1993).
197. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1984) (discussing § 504); Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983) (discussing Title VI); Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (discussing § 504). In a dissenting opinion in a case
regarding attorney's fees, Justice Brennan confirmed the implication that Title VI does not seem to require
administrativeexhaustion. See North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, 479 U.S.
6, 21 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Title VI plaintiffs are "unfettered" by requirement to
exhaust administrative remedies). Further, circuit courts have explicitly stated that § 504 does not require
administrative exhaustion. See, e.g., Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990) ("private
plaintiffs suing under § 504 need not first exhaust administrative remedies"); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d
969, 978 (8th Cir. 1982) ("§ 504 suits appropriately may be maintained in advance of the exhaustion of
administrative remedies.").
198. For text of § 1983, see supra note 128.
199. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988 by adding
the following provision:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986
of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], or in any civil action or
proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation
of, a provision of ... title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988. Fees are available in both federal and state courts. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1, 8-11 (1980). Recovery of attorney's fees is crucial because it enables plaintiffs who otherwise would
not be able to bring suits to enforce their rights in court.
200. For a discussion of strategies for identifying potential defendants, see infra notes 246-56 and
accompanying text.
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it is unlikely that a private institution receiving public funds would be subject
to suit under § 1983.20 t Therefore, plaintiffs bringing actions against private
treatment programs may be limited to suing directly under the ADAMHA
statute. An additional limitation on plaintiffs pursuing § 1983 claims is that
they may only seek injunctive relief.2 2 Where they seek damages from a
state, they will have to sue directly under ADAMHA. Nevertheless, the
broader test for implied actions and the availability of attorney's fees under
§ 1983 make it an important instrument for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief
from state actors.
In Maine v. Thiboutot, °3 the Supreme Court held for the first time that
there is a cause of action under § 1983 to enforce a violation of a federal
statute by a state actor.2' The Court stated that the plain language of § 1983
covers statutory as well as constitutional claims20 5 and that the somewhat
"scanty" legislative history of the statute offers no reason to override its
apparent meaning. 206
Following this decision, the Court established two exceptions to the general
presumption in favor of § 1983 remedies for statutory violations: "where
Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself
and where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or
immunities within the meaning of § 1983."207 This approach differs from that
in Cort, because the Cort "test reflects a concern, grounded in separation of
powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of
remedies for violations of statutes. "208 Because § 1983 expressly authorizes
private rights of action, separation of powers concerns are not implicated.
Thus, whereas under Cort a plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate that a
right of action exists, under § 1983 a right of action will be assumed unless
"Congress has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy. "209
Congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983 remedy-the first
exception-may be indicated by a comprehensive statutory remedial
scheme.2t0 Only two Supreme Court cases have identified remedial systems
sufficient to preclude a § 1983 action: Middlesex County Sewerage Authority
201. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982) (holding that a private school that
received over 90% of its financial support from public funds was not a state actor).
202. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text (noting that the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization
Act only abrogates state immunity from damage actions for cases brought directly under the statute).
203. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
204. See id. at 4-5.
205. See id. at 4. Section 1983 covers the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and taws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (emphasis added).
206. See Maine, 448 U.S. at 7-8.
207. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987).
208. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990).
209. Id.
210. The burden is on the defendant to show that such a scheme forecloses a § 1983 remedy. See
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520-21; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 21 n.31 (1981).
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v. National Sea Clanmers Association1 and Smith v. Robinson.212 Unlike
the ADAMHA Reorganization Act, the statutes involved in these cases
explicitly offered judicial remedies for private plaintiffs. 23  The Sea
Clammers environmental statutes provided for a variety of enforcement
provisions, including government suits for civil and criminal penalties and
private actions for injunctive relief,214 while the Education of the
Handicapped Act at issue in Smith offered comprehensive administrative
and judicial remedial schemes beginning at the local level.216 (The statutory
remedies in Smith were meant to allow states to retain their traditional role in
overseeing education.)2 7 Because ADAMHA has a quite general remedial
scheme and explicitly grants no private judicial or administrative remedies,2"'
it is unlikely that Sea Clammers or Smith forecloses § 1983 remedies for
violations of ADAMHA.2 1 9
ADAMHA's general remedial scheme is more analogous to that at issue
in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association.220 In Wilder, the Court found that
a § 1983 remedy was not foreclosed for private actions alleging violations of
the Medicaid Act, a statute with a delineated yet limited enforcement scheme.
Like ADAMHA's nondiscrimination clause, the Medicaid Act does not
explicitly provide private judicial or administrative remedies, but rather allows
the Federal executive branch to act. Specifically, under the Medicaid Act, the
Secretary can withhold funds to obtain statutory compliance.2 21 While the
ADAMHA statute offers such a remedy,222 it also provides particular
enforcement procedures under the nondiscrimination clause itself.2"
Nevertheless, ADAMHA's nondiscrimination enforcement mechanisms
empowering the Attorney General stand in stark contrast to the highly detailed
judicial and administrative schemes flagged by the Court in Sea Clammers and
Smith.224 Thus, while ADAMHA's enforcement mechanisms may be
211. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
212. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
213. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009; Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20; see also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520-21
(discussing why § 1983 remedies were foreclosed in Sea Clammers and Smith).
214. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13-14.
215. This statute is now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. See 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1400(a) (West Supp. 1994).
216. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009-13.
217. Id. at 1010.
218. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-57 (West Supp. 1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 125-28
(explaining the nondiscrimination provision's enforcement mechanisms).
219. ADAMHA plaintiffs would be relying on what seems to be quite a strong presumption in favor
of private § 1983 actions. For example, the Court has held that the existence of a state administrative
remedy does not automatically foreclose access to a § 1983 action in federal court. See Wright v. City
of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1987) (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496, 516 (1982)).
220. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
221. See id. at 521.
222. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-55(a) (West Supp. 1993).
223. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-57(a), (b) (West Supp. 1993).
224. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521. The Wilder Court noted that in Sea Clammers the enforcement
scheme "granted the Environmental Protection Agency considerable enforcement power through the use
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somewhat more expansive than those in the Medicaid Act, they still remain
in the realm of general executive branch schemes. Accordingly, Congress has
not foreclosed the availability of § 1983 remedies for violations of ADAMHA.
The question remains whether ADAMHA creates enforceable rights within
the meaning of § 1983. There are two situations in which a right may not be
enforceable: 1) when the statute demonstrates a congressional preference rather
than a mandate, and 2) when the right created is too vague to be enforced by
the judiciary. 21 In Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,226 the Court held
that a § 1983 remedy was not available because the provision the plaintiffs
sought to enforce merely indicated a congressional preference rather than a
mandate for specific treatment of people with disabilities.227 Compliance with
this preference was not a condition of federal funding.22 Therefore, the
Pennhurst plaintiffs could not bring a § 1983 action to secure treatment in the
least restrictive environment for people with developmental disabilities.
In Wilder and Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing
Authority, however, the Court found that the statutes in question indicated a
congressional mandate, creating enforceable rights. In Wright, the Brooke
Amendment to the Housing Act established rent ceilings for tenants in
low-income public housing projects.229 In Wilder, the Boren Amendment to
the Medicaid Act provided specific guidelines for setting "reasonable and
adequate" reimbursement rates to health care providers and conditioned federal
funding on compliance with the amendment."0 ADAMHA establishes a
similar mandate. The language of the nondiscrimination provision creates a
required-not preferred-prohibition against discrimination, and, as does the
Boren Amendment, conditions federal funding on compliance. 1
A § 1983 remedy also may be denied if the underlying statute is too vague
to be enforced. In both Wright and Wilder, the Court found that the statutes
were sufficiently clear. 1 2 Both cases involved statutes requiring, in part, that
of noncompliance orders, civil suits, and criminal penalties," and also contained two private enforcement
provisions. Id. Regarding Smith, the Wilder Court explained that the "elaborate" scheme in question
"included local administrative review and culminated in a right to judicial review." Id.
225. See id. at 510, 519.
226. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
227. See id. at 19. The Court explained that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act
is a mere federal-state funding statute. The explicit purposes of the Act are simply "to assist"
the States through the use of federal grants to improve the care and treatment of the mentally
retarded. Nothing in either the "overall" or "specific" purposes of the Act reveals an intent to
require the States to fund new, substantive rights. Surely Congress would not have established
such elaborate funding incentives had it simply intended to impose absolute obligations on the
States.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
228. Id. at 22-23.
229. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 420 (1987).
230. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
232. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519-520; Wright, 479 U.S. at 430-32.
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states act reasonably,23' a more ambiguous obligation than ADAMHA's clear
prohibition of discrimination. The Wilder Court noted that a grant of some
discretion does not render a provision unenforceable: a state must still act
within certain parameters, and courts have enough expertise to evaluate
compliance with the statute's requirements. 4 The Wright and Wilder Courts
looked to the statutes' respective regulations for guidance in construing
"reasonable" state action. 5 By contrast, ADAMHA's nondiscrimination
provision does not require explication of "reasonableness," thus there is no
vagueness hurdle.
Recently, however, the Court in Suter v. Artist M."6 refused to permit
a § 1983 action under a spending power statute, the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act. As in Wright and Wilder, the statute in Suter required
reasonable state action in a decision to remove a child from her home. 7 The
Court compared the provision in Suter to that in Pennhurst, because both are
spending power statutes," 8 explaining that when Congress conditions federal
funding on compliance with a certain requirement it must do so
"unambiguously."" In this case, however, the Court did not find that the
statute, its regulations, or its legislative history provided any guidance in
defining "reasonable" 2" and thus concluded that the reasonableness
requirement did not confer an enforceable right.
The ADAMHA nondiscrimination provision, however, creates a clear
obligation for the states. As noted earlier, the language does not mandate that
states act reasonably, rather that they absolutely refrain from discrimination.
Further, to the extent that ambiguity might be posited as a problem, guidance
in interpretation can be gleaned from caselaw involving similar civil rights
statutes.24" ' The legislative history also lends insight into the statute's
parameters, indicating congressional understanding of pregnancy discrimination
in drug treatment programs and the extent of congressional willingness to
change the status quo.242 A court will have many sources of guidance in
interpreting the ADAMHA nondiscrimination provision, thereby allowing it
to entertain § 1983 actions.
233. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519; Wright, 479 U.S. at 430.
234. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519-20.
235. Id. at 507-08, 519 n.17; Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32.
236. 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
237. Id. at 1367.
238. See id. at 1366. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution contains the spending power, which provides
that "Congress shall have Power To... provide for the ... general Welfare of the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
239. Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1366 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
240. Id. at 1368-69.
241. For a discussion of statutes offering substantive guidance in interpreting ADAMHA's
nondiscrimination provision, see infra notes 291-310 and accompanying text (Title VII and § 504).
242. See H.R. REP. No. 546, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1992) (explaining that although the statute
does not require treatment on demand, pregnant women must "be afforded preferential treatment in
admission to treatment programs, and ... interim services . . . while they are awaiting admission to
treatment").
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C. Identifying Potential Defendants
In addition to establishing their right to bring a cause of action, plaintiffs
must identify the appropriate defendants in their cases. The ADAMHA
nondiscrimination provision does not expressly state which entity or entities
(states, municipalities, and/or treatment programs) are bound by its mandate.
Rather, the language ensures that "[n]o person shall . . . be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under, any program or activity funded" by ADAMHA block grants.243 The
enforcement section may be triggered, however, when "a State, or an entity
[that receives ADAMHA funding] . . . has failed to comply."'24 Therefore,
both states245 and treatment programs receiving federal funding are bound
by the nondiscrimination provision and may be subject to suit.
While a suit against a specific program may secure relief for a particular
plaintiff, a broader action against the state-either instead of, or as a
supplement to, the action against the program-may offer two advantages with
respect to injunctive relief.2" Because the state has access to a continuum
of resources and can identify appropriate alternatives, a suit against a state may
provide relief where a particular program could not accommodate the plaintiff.
Additionally, the state, unlike an individual program, may be able to bring
about large-scale change in treatment accessibility.
The Act's statutory scheme and legislative history support placing the
ultimate burden of providing access to treatment on the states. The Act places
states in charge of providing services to pregnant women.247 Where a
particular clinic can not accommodate a pregnant woman, the burden shifts to
the state to find an alternative location or to provide the woman with interim
services within forty-eight hours.248 In addition, the general approach of the
statute provides for disbursements to states, which then determine, within
certain parameters, the individual recipients of the federal funding.249
243. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-57(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
244. Id. § 300x-57(b)(1).
245. Specifically, the suit would be brought against the head of the state agency responsible for
disbursing federal funding. Where a clinic controverts state policy, however, and discriminates by
categorically excluding pregnant women, a suit against the clinic itself would be appropriate. The state,
however, may also be liable in such instances if it knowingly provides federal funds to a discriminatory
program. Under such a theory, a municipality might be liable if it were serving as an intermediary between
the state and a treatment program, and knowingly passed along funds to a clinic that discriminates against
pregnant women. It is important to note that if a § 1983 claim is brought against a municipality, the plaintiff
will have to show that the alleged violation was an official policy or custom of the defendant municipality.
See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
246. For a more detailed discussion of the availability of injunctive and damage remedies, see infra
notes 258-77 and accompanying text.
247. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-27(a) (West Supp. 1993) (listing duties of stategrantees in providing services
to pregnant women).
248. Id. § 300x-27(b)(2).
249. Id. § 300x-21.
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Further, the legislative histories of the ADAMHA Reorganization Act and
its predecessor demonstrate congressional intent to place an obligation squarely
on the states. In the debate over the Act, Representative Henry Waxman
explained that ADAMHA was designed to make the states "responsible-as
a condition of receiving block grants funds-for assuring the availability of
appropriate care."' 0 The intent of the 1981 Congress that first created
ADAMHA is especially enlightening on this point. The block grant program
was created in the first year of the Reagan Administration"' in an effort to
restore state control and foster versatile approaches to solving national
problems. 2 One Senate report explained that "the general effect will be to
return basic control and responsibility to the State level. ""
D. Obtaining Relief
In addition to identifying defendants, plaintiffs bringing suit under
ADAMHA's nondiscrimination provision must identify the nature of the relief
they are seeking. The Supreme Court in Guardians Association v. Civil Service
Commission of New York" 4 explained that the issue of relief is "analytically
distinct" from the initial question of whether a plaintiff may bring a private
cause of action. 5 Although a court may have already determined that a
plaintiff can bring her claim, it still must address whether it should award
injunctive relief and/or damages. A damage remedy involves monetary
recovery. An injunctive remedy, at a minimum, enables a particular plaintiff
to enter treatment, and, more extensively, requires some restructuring of the
treatment delivery system in order to better accommodate pregnant
drug-addicted women. The enforcement provisions of the ADAMHA
nondiscrimination clause only address remedies available where the Attorney
General enforces the statute in federal court, allowing for "such relief as may
be appropriate, including injunctive relief."6 Because the statute does not
explicitly provide for private enforcement, "it is hardly surprising that
Congress also said nothing about the applicable remedies for an implied right
of action."" The civil rights statutes containing nondiscrimination language
similar to that of ADAMHA again offer some guidance, this time in
determining the proper scope of relief.
250. 138 CONG. REC. H5702 (daily ed. July 1, 1992) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
251. DAVID GATES, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL FUNDING
PROGRAMS FOR THE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG DEPENDENCY 20 (1990)
(on file with author).
252. See S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 871 (1981) ("States are encouraged to seek the
resolution of health problems according to their own needs, even if such resolution leads them to models
or approaches completely different from those formerly sponsored by the federal government.").
253. Id.
254. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
255. Id. at 595 (plurality opinion) (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979)).
256. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-57(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
257. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1035 (1992).
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In addressing the availability of injunctive relief under Title VI, the
Guardians Court explained that such a remedy may better meet the goals of
a spending power statute than would the termination of funding, even where
the latter remedy is explicitly allowed by the language of the statute."8 The
Court noted that the legislative history of Title VI revealed the ultimate goal
of the statute: elimination of discrimination. "The remedy of termination of
assistance was regarded as 'a last resort, to be used only if all else fails,'
because 'cutoffs of Federal funds would defeat important objectives of Federal
legislation, without commensurate gains in eliminating racial discrimination
or segregation. ' "' 9 This same rationale applies to pregnancy discrimination
in drug treatment programs because the goal of expanding treatment
opportunities for pregnant women would not be met where clinics deemed to
be discriminatory only suffered a loss of funding. In fact, such a response
could exacerbate the problem.
The Guardians Court also addressed money damages, limiting the
availability of such relief to instances of intentional (or facial)
discrimination.26 ° This approach was based on the nature of the relationship
between the federal government and entities receiving grants pursuant to the
Spending Clause. The Court explained that "the receipt of federal funds under
typical Spending Clause legislation is a consensual matter: the State . . .
weighs the benefits and burdens before accepting the funds and agreeing to
comply with the conditions attached to their receipt."261 Consequently,
monetary awards may be available where a grant recipient is aware of its
obligation under the program in question and knowingly breaches that
requirement.262 Because the exclusion of pregnant women from drug
treatment programs generally is an explicit policy,263 most ADAMHA
defendants will be facing challenges to intentional discrimination. Those
programs or states found to have committed intentional discrimination against
pregnant women may be liable for damages.
In a recent Title IX case, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,'"
the Court reaffirmed its broad approach to injunctive relief and its much
narrower view of damages. Regarding injunctive relief, the Court explained
that "[t]he general rule . .. is that absent clear direction to the contrary by
Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief
in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute."265
Accordingly, the Franklin Court found that the Title IX plaintiff could rely on
258. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 601-02 (plurality opinion).
259. Id. at 601 (quoting 110 CoNG. REC. H6544, 6546 (1964)).
260. Id. at 597.
261. Id. at 596.
262. Id. at 597. Injunctive relief, however, is the standard remedy under Title VI. See, e.g., Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
263. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
264. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
265. Id. at 1035.
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the "traditional presumption in favor of all appropriate relief."2' Similarly,
an ADAMHA plaintiff may ask the federal courts to exercise broad powers
in determining the extent to which treatment regimens must change to accept
pregnant women.
The Franklin Court followed earlier decisions that limited awards of
damages to intentional discrimination.267 The Court chose to award damages
in this case, where a student had brought suit against a school district for
sexual harassment by a teacher. 6 Emphasizing the importance of providing
meaningful relief, the Court observed that prospective injunctive relief would
be worthless because the teacher was no longer employed at the school and
the plaintiff had since graduated.269 This rationale similarly may allow for
damage recoveries in ADAMHA suits where plaintiffs cannot avail themselves
of injunctive relief and where intent to discriminate can be shown. Individual
plaintiffs and a portion of plaintiffs in ADAMHA class action suits (including
the named class representatives), likely will not still be pregnant when a
judgment is rendered. Therefore, as in Franklin, such plaintiffs will not be able
to avail themselves of an injunction admitting them into treatment and will only
benefit from an award of money damages. Unlike Franklin, however, where
injunctive relief was not awarded because the teacher had left the district,
named plaintiffs in ADAMHA class action suits will also be able to secure
injunctive relief because the programs will be able to offer treatment in the
future to pregnant women.27
One final issue remains on the subject of remedies. Because states may be
implicated as defendants, the question inevitably arises as to whether the
Eleventh Amendment27' proscribes damage awards against them. As noted
above, while injunctive relief may benefit many members of a certified class,
some plaintiffs likely will no longer be pregnant and will be unable to benefit
from injunctive relief (unless they again become pregnant and are still seeking
drug treatment).272
The Supreme Court has held that states are immune from damage actions
unless they waive their immunity and consent to suit.273 Under the Civil
266. Id. at 1036.
267. See id. at 1036-37. The Court noted that if Congress had intended to further limit damage
awards, it could have done so in the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1986 or the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987. Since Congress did not articulate any such intent, the Court preserved the right
to recover damages for intentional violations. Id.
268. Id. at 1038.
269. Id. An award of back pay also would be useless. Id.
270. Plaintiffs could be separated into two subclasses-one receiving only injunctive relief and one
eligible for damages. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B) ("When appropriate a class may be divided into
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class").
271. U.S. CONsT. amend. X1.
272. "For people in Bivens' shoes [whose constitutionally protected interests have been violated], it
is damages or nothing." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)
273. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673-78 (1974) (invalidating order requiring payment of state
funds as compensation to those denied benefits under challenged scheme).
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Rights Remedies Equalization Act,274 however, a plaintiff can recover
damages from a defendant state in a suit brought directly under the ADAMHA
provision. The amendment abrogates states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Title IX, § 504, Title VI, the Age Discrimination Act, and "the
provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients
of Federal financial assistance."27 Since ADAMHA falls under the
description in the last clause of the amendment, a plaintiff suing a state will
be able to rely on this explicit abrogation of damage immunity and seek both
injunctive relief and damages. This abrogation, however, does not apply to
suits brought against the state under § 1983. Courts will presume that states
retain immunity under § 1983 because that immunity is not clearly waived in
the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act.276 This limitation applies in both
state and federal court.277
Plaintiffs bringing suit directly under ADAMHA will be able to seek both
injunctive and damage remedies, although the availability of damages may be
limited to certain types of actions (challenges to intentional discrimination) and
parties (plaintiffs who are no longer pregnant and who therefore can not avail
themselves of injunctive relief). Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 will be limited
to injunctive relief. The value of injunctive relief, however, should not be
underestimated. Injunctions address the problem specifically targeted by the
statute-pervasive exclusion of pregnant women from drug treatment. They
also hold the potential for securing large-scale future change.
Damages also serve a number of crucial functions. They compensate the
victims of discrimination and serve as a punishment for defendants' past acts,
as well as a deterrent against future acts of discrimination. The deterrence
function may be the most important for the class of pregnant women seeking
treatment. Since treatment programs exclude pregnant women in part due to
concerns regarding liability, the threat of ADAMHA damage actions may
eliminate any perceived monetary benefit from discriminatory policies.
Plaintiffs seeking damages, however, may want to weigh the benefits of such
actions against the already short supply of funding for drug treatment
programs. This short supply of funding may counsel plaintiffs to place a
reasonable ceiling on their requests for damages.
The above discussion regarding causes of action, potential defendants, and
remedies highlights some important strategic considerations that ADAMHA
plaintiffs will face. For example, while a plaintiff may have claims for a
private action both under ADAMHA directly and under § 1983, § 1983 offers
274. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988). This amendment, abrogating states' immunity, was passed in
reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985),
which required that Congress "unequivocally" abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id.
at 243.
275. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (a)(1) (1988).
276. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
277. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 66 (1989) (holding that states are
not persons under § 1983 for purposes of damage actions and thus retain immunity under § 1983).
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more latitude for bringing such actions. However, while § 1983 also provides
for attorney's fees, it does not allow suits against private actors, nor does it
enable plaintiffs to seek damages from the state. Further, damages may only
be available for certain types of plaintiffs, and only where intent can be shown.
Therefore, plaintiffs challenging pregnancy discrimination in drug treatment
programs will need to identify and analyze the scope and nature of relief they
are seeking in order to plan their litigation strategy appropriately.
IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NONDISCRIMINATION
PROVISION
In order for a plaintiff to recover under ADAMHA's nondiscrimination
provision, she must show that the defendant has violated the substantive
requirements of the Act. This section will examine what the statute requires.
In other words, what constitutes pregnancy discrimination in the drug treatment
context? After developing a legal standard, including a delineation of the prima
facie case and affirmative defenses, this section will apply the standard to the
current picture of drug treatment to determine the viability of plaintiffs' and
defendants' claims.
A. Presenting the Prima Facie Case and Affirmative Defenses
1. The Prima Facie Case
A plaintiff will have made a prima facie case of facial or intentional
discrimination under ADAMHA where she can show that she was explicitly
excluded from treatment due to her pregnancy (for example, that the program
has a written policy excluding pregnant women), or that particular burdens
were placed on her simply because she was pregnant (such as insurance
requirements or limitations on admittance based on the stage of her pregnancy).
The Supreme Court has explained that a policy is facially discriminatory where
it treats members of one group differently because they are identified as part
of that group.27 A woman who is treated differently simply because she is
pregnant has been subjected to facial discrimination. This Article's
development of the prima facie case will focus on intentional discrimination
because the evidence indicates that this is the type of exclusion pregnant
drug-addicted women generally face.279
In apparent contradiction to the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court,
a state appellate court in New York held that excluding women simply because
they are pregnant is not facially discriminatory under the state's public
278. City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978).
279. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
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accommodations law.20 In Elaine W v. Joint Diseases North General
Hospital, the first case challenging pregnancy discrimination in substance abuse
services, the court found that such a practice was not discriminatory, but rather
was "based upon sound medical judgment." 28 ' The court explained that
women were not the only group to be excluded, because "psychotic patients"
were also denied admission due to the hospital's inability to provide sufficient
medical care, and thus only medical judgment, not discrimination, was
involved.2"2 This analysis, however, was rejected by the New York Court of
Appeals, which held that North General's blanket exclusion of pregnant women
constituted discrimination.2 83 The New York Court of Appeals adhered to
the U.S. Supreme Court's approach in International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls2 84 in defining facial discrimination. The Supreme Court in Johnson
Controls explained that, "[w]hether [a] practice involves .. .explicit facial
discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather
on the explicit terms of the discrimination."25 Justifications may be utilized
as affirmative defenses but they are not sufficient to support a finding that a
policy is not discriminatory.
While most cases of pregnancy discrimination in drug treatment involve
instances of facially discriminatory policies, those programs that engage in
covert, intentional discrimination or use policies that disparately affect pregnant
women also may be vulnerable under ADAMHA. This issue is especially
relevant because programs that currently utilize overt policies of discrimination
may, as a response to ADAMHA litigation or related pressure, alter their
approaches to more subtle means of excluding pregnant women. While the
development of a substantive doctrine for addressing these forms of
discrimination is beyond the scope of this article, the judicial approaches under
other statutes could provide some guidance.2"6
2. Is an Affirmative Defense Available?
Because an ADAMHA plaintiff generally will satisfy the prima facie case
simply by showing that she has been subjected to facial discrimination, drug
treatment programs who explicitly differentiate between pregnant women and
other individuals seeking treatment will have to resort to affirmative defenses
280. Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 580 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1992).
281. Id. at 247. The trial court granted summary judgment on this basis. See id.
282. Id. at 248.
283. Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. 1993).
284. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
285. Id. at 199.
286. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (clarifying Title
VII disparate treatment doctrine); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (outlining
Title VII disparate treatment doctrine); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (establishing a
disparate impact approach under Title VII). Although the Supreme Court overruled the Griggs test in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658-61 (1989), Congress reestablished the Griggs standard
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (West Supp. 1993).
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to justify their policies. The two primary reasons likely to be put forth by
treatment programs for excluding pregnant women are the inability to provide
medically safe treatment and the fear of tort liability." 7
The ADAMHA Reorganization Act is silent regarding the availability of
affirmative defenses. The statute's treatment of the issue of pregnancy
discrimination is limited to a brief proscription of such conduct in the
nondiscrimination clause. Similarly, the legislative history does not shed any
light on this matter. Rather, as noted earlier, Congress' discussion focused on
the severe treatment crisis for pregnant women.288 This scarcity of
information is not surprising, however, since Congress did not even address
the question of private causes of action under ADAMHA.2 9
The question of affirmative defenses may be explored by examining
approaches used under similar civil rights statutes. The first question, then,
in analyzing an affirmative defense under ADAMHA's nondiscrimination
provision, is whether similar civil rights statutes ever allow a defendant to put
forth justifications for discrimination and, if so, under what circumstances. In
some cases, statutes proscribing discrimination explicitly provide for
exceptions. For example, under Title IX, Congress listed a number of contexts
in which recipients of federal funds could distinguish upon the basis of sex,
including military training, social organizations and voluntary youth service
organizations, parent-child events at educational institutions and scholarships
awarded in "beauty pageants. " " The ADAMHA Reorganization Act,
however, does not provide any statutory exceptions. The Title IX provision
suggests that Congress knows how to provide exceptions when it wants to do
and that courts should not permit affirmative defenses unless specifically
provided for by statute.
In some circumstances, however, Congress and the Court have allowed
defendants more flexibility by creating less definite obligations under federal
civil rights statutes. For example, under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a
federally funded entity need only make "reasonable modifications" for a person
with disabilities.29 Similarly, under Title VII, an employer challenged with
287. See, e.g., ElaineW. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 580 N.Y.S.2d 246, 247 (App. Div. 1992)
(noting hospital claim that it is not equipped to provide obstetrical care) ; Hemphill, supra note 23, at 8
(observing that programs claim they are not equipped to provide obstetrical and gynecological care); Miller,
supra note 108, at 8 (stating that pregnant women who undergo drug treatment are perceived by insurers
as "high-risk" and "more likely to sue the facility"); Polsky, supra note 23, at 6 (explaining that women
are generally excluded due to "liability and costs associated with providing medical and child care"); Tracy
et al., supra note 48, at 7 (noting that programs generally refuse to treat pregnant women because of fear
of liability and "perceived medical complications").
288. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
289. See supra text accompanying note 257.
290. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)-(9) (1988).
291. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985). The actual language of § 504's prohibits
discrimination against an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual... solely by reason of her or his
handicap." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Court has noted that
the question of who is "otherwise qualified" and what actions constitute "discrimination" under
the section would seem to be two sides of a single coin; the ultimate question is the extent to
which a grantee is required to make reasonable modifications in its programs for the needs of
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facial discrimination may make distinctions on the basis of "religion, sex, or
national origin" where it is a "bona fide occupational qualification."
292
The § 504 and Title VII doctrines provide useful models for interpreting
ADAMHA's nondiscrimination provision. Unlike the rigid statutory scheme
in Title IX, they are based on general statutory mandates and courts primarily
create exceptions through judicial interpretation.2 93 Moreover, both bodies
of law acknowledge the need for realistic compromises, avoiding the danger
of imposing absolutes in complex environments. Section 504 requires only
"reasonable accommodation," because financial and physical practicalities may
preclude infinite accomodations for people with disabilities.294 Similarly,
Title VII's BFOQ standard, while creating a narrow exception, allows
distinctions to be made in the workplace where "real differences" exist.295
a. The Section 504 Model
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,296 the Court examined for
the first time a defendant's obligation under § 504. In Davis, a college nursing
program had denied entrance to the respondent because of her hearing
disability. The Court found the denial lawful, holding that § 504 did not
the handicapped.
Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299 n. 19.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988).
293. While the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) under Title VII also offers a tool for interpreting
pregnancy discrimination, this comparison would be inapposite here because of its specific nature. Unlike
the general proscriptions under Title VIi's BFOQ standard (of which the PDA is a part) and under § 504,
the PDA offers detailed guidelines regarding treatment of pregnant women in the workplace. The PDA
added subsection (k) to § 701, providing definitions for Title VII. It provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because of or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affectedby pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise. This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for
abortion, except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term,
or except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided, That nothing herein
shall preclude an employer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements
in regard to abortion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). Thus, the doctrine surrounding the PDA relies more on the extensive
language of the statute than on judicial interpretations.
294. Justice Marshall in Alexander noted Congress' perception of the nature of discrimination against
people with disabilities as "not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of
benign neglect." Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295. He went on to note that federal agencies and commentators
view "discrimination against the handicapped [as] primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than
affirmative animus." Id. at 296. Similarly, the exclusion of pregnant women from drug treatment programs
does not fall into the traditional category of "affirmative animus." Pregnant women are excluded from
treatment because of perceived insufficiencies in medical support and fears of liability. Nevertheless, the
exclusion is part of a larger phenomenon in which pregnant women are blamed for their addiction and made
the objects of prosecutions and other coercive state-sponsored measures. Thus, while the immediate cause
for excluding pregnant women from drug treatment may not be motivated by "affirmative animus," the
problem seems to go beyond "benign neglect."
295. Although these flexible standards present opportunities for misapplication, they also provide
leeway for important compromises.
296. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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require the college to disregard her disability or to make "substantial
modifications" in its program to accommodate her.297 The Court cited
"undue financial and administrative burdens upon [the] State" as relevant
considerations. 29 It also noted, however, that "situations may arise where a
refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and
discriminatory. "299
Six years later, in Alexander v. Choate,3"° the Court provided additional
guidance in interpreting § 504. The Court explained that § 504 might, in some
circumstances, require more than the provision of identical services to people
with disabilities to assure meaningful access to a federal grantee's
program. 01 The Court noted that § 504 "is intended to encompass the
concept of equivalent, as opposed to identical, services,"302 but does not
require states "to alter [their] definition of [a] benefit being offered simply to
meet the reality that the handicapped have greater . ..needs."3"3 Applying
this standard, the Court denied relief to plaintiffs seeking additional days of
Medicaid inpatient hospital coverage for people with disabilities, explaining
that plaintiffs would benefit meaningfully from the state's Medicaid package.
Accordingly to Alexander, § 504 requires a recipient of federal funds to ensure
that people with disabilities have some access to their programs, although the
extent of accommodation may be limited by the entity's available resources.
b. The itle VII Model
The BFOQ exception under Title VII should also inform the obligations
of federally funded drug treatment programs under ADAMHA.3 °M While
employers may make sex-based distinctions based upon a "bona fide
occupational qualification," the Court in Johnson Controls explained the
narrow purview of this defense, emphasizing the need for an "objective,
verifiable requirement" 3" rather than "an employer's idiosyncratic
requirement."" Under Title VII, the question is whether a change in the
297. Id. at 405.
298. Id. at 412.
299. Id. at 413.
300. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
301. Id. at 305-06.
302. Id. at 305 n.26 (quoting 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A at 1 6 (1984)).
303. Id. at 303.
304. "Under § 703 (e)(1) of Title VII, an employer may discriminate on the basis of 'religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.'" International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988)).
305. Id. at 201.
306. Id.; see also Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 n.13 (1983) (stating
that sex is not a verifiable indicator of longevity); City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (same); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-33 (1977) (stating that height and
weight requirements are not an appropriate indicator of strength).
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employer's particular practice would threaten the "essence of the
business."307 If a change does not present such a threat, the employer must
alter its policy and eliminate the facial discrimination."'
The Court in Johnson Controls proceeded to address two defenses that do
not qualify as threats to the essence of an operation. First, the Court noted that
fear of tort liability will not save a defendant from her obligation under Title
VII. "When it is impossible . . . to comply with both state and federal
requirements, [the] Court has ruled that federal law preempts that of the
States. " ° Second, the Court stated that extra cost, unless prohibitive, does
not provide an affirmative defense to pregnancy discrimination under Title VII.
"Congress considered at length the considerable cost of providing equal
treatment of pregnancy and related conditions, but made the 'decision to forbid
special treatment of pregnancy despite the social costs associated
therewith.'"310 Although Title VII's BFOQ standard allows defendants some
latitude where elimination of a discriminatory policy would threaten the
business, the types of justifications that a court will accept are fairly
circumscribed.
c. An Affirmative Defense Under ADAMHA
In examining the § 504 and Title VII doctrines to develop an affirmative
defense under ADAMHA's nondiscrimination provision, a central concern
emerges. Both approaches focus on the ability of a putative defendant to
respond to the needs of a plaintiff without threatening its own ability to
function. Section 504 requires reasonable modifications, limited by the
defendant's resources." Similarly, Title VII allows a defendant to
discriminate where a change in such a practice would threaten the "essence"
of the operation.3"2
307. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203.
308. While the BFOQ paradigm ostensibly provides an exception to Title VIi's negative proscription
against discrimination, in contrast to the more affirmative "reasonable accommodation" standard under
§ 504, there are some circumstances in which an employer under Title VII similarly will be required to
make an accommodation. Because the Court has noted that BFOQ is an objective standard, merely
idiosyncratic requirements put forth by an employer to justify discrimination (i.e. practices that are not
bona fide occupational requirements) will be rejected. In such circumstances, the employer will be required
to change its operations and accommodate the employee(s) in question.
309. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 209. In addition, the Court in Johnson Controls left open the
question of whether a defendant could allege that the costs of defending a tort liability suit would endanger
its ability to function. Id. at 210. For an analysis of whether fear of liability is a valid defense for
ADAMHA defendants, see infra notes 357-64 and accompanying text.
310. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210 (quoting Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S.
1073, 1085 n.14 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
311. See supra notes 296-303 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 304-310 and accompanying text. While the BFOQ standard applies to facial
discrimination cases, an ADAMHA plaintiff bringing suit for disparate impact discrimination may be able




An analogous requirement under ADAMHA, then, would allow pregnancy
discrimination only where the elimination of such a practice would affect the
integrity of a defendant's program. This Article suggests the following
standard: Pregnancy discrimination under ADAMHA is permissible only where
it is necessary to achieve a fundamental objective of the program. Under the
first prong of this test, fundamental objectives include the medically safe
treatment of clients313 and the avoidance of any cost that jeopardizes the
viability of the program.314 Yet, a defendant will have to show more than
an effort to satisfy one of these goals. Under the second part of the standard,
a defendant bears the burden (after the plaintiff has satisfied the prima facie
case) of demonstrating that discrimination against pregnant women is necessary
to meet its goal or goals. "Necessary" means that a policy can only be satisfied
through the means used-that no reasonable alternatives exist.
An analogous standard was put forth by the New York Court of Appeals
in a case brought under the state's public accommodations law. In Elaine W
v. Joint Diseases North General Hospital,"5 plaintiffs challenged blanket
exclusions of pregnant women from detoxification programs. The defendant
hospital asserted a medical justification, claiming that it could not treat
pregnant women because it did not have an obstetrical staff or a license to
provide such services. 316 The court accepted as legitimate the defendant's
stated goal of offering medically safe treatment, 317 but the court held that a
defendant could not invoke this objective to justify blanket exclusions unless
the exclusions were always necessary to provide safe treatment, or, in the
alternative, unless the defendant could not discern in advance which women
might be treated safely.31 The court stated that the defendant would have
to prove that the blanket exclusions were medically warranted in all cases at
trial.
319
Importantly, the court stated that the defendant could not carry its burden
"by showing that some, or even many, pregnant women should not be treated
for substance abuse without the availability of immediate on-site obstetrical
services. . . . '[E]ven a true generalization about the class is an insufficient
reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not
apply.'"320 Similarly, under ADAMHA a defendant asserting a medical
defense would be required to prove that the generalization supporting its
313. Under a related test for pregnancy discrimination in substance abuse treatment, the New York
Court of Appeals identified medically warranted exclusions as acceptable. See Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases
N. Gen. Hosp. Inc., 613 N.E.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. 1993).
314. This objective is based on the notion that discrimination is justified if eliminating it would threaten
the essence of the operation. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203.
315. 613 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993).
316. Id. at 524.
317. Id. at 525.
318. See id. at 524.
319. Id. at 526.
320. Id. at 526 (quoting City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1978)).
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blanket exclusion of pregnant women always applies, or, in the alternative,
that there are no other means to screen out unsafe cases.32 1
This factual inquiry, as part of the "necessary" prong, serves as an
important check on vague, generalized claims by ADAMHA defendants that
blanket exclusions are medically warranted. While courts may be tempted to
adopt such justifications without analysis, these defenses require a careful
factual evaluation, especially in light of the history of judicial reliance on
medical reasons to justify discrimination. For example, as late as the 1960s,
unexamined assertions of "medical judgment" were used to justify racial
segregation in health care facilities.322 Quite recently, the lower court in
Elaine W granted summary judgment for the defendants based on unexamined
medical justifications that rationalized blanket exclusions of pregnant women
from detoxification programs."2 Under the proposed standard, while
medically warranted blanket exclusions theoretically could be accepted under
ADAMHA, the question remains whether such an exclusion could be factually
supported under the second prong of the ADAMHA analysis.
B. Analyzing the Affirmative Defenses
This Section will analyze the viability of affirmative defenses under the
ADAMHA nondiscrimination provision. It will use the legal standard proposed
above to evaluate the two primary types of defenses likely to be put forth by
ADAMHA defendants: medical justification and fear of tort liability. Such
affirmative defenses generally would fail in a suit under ADAMHA's
nondiscrimination provision. Blanket exclusions of pregnant women are not
necessary to preserve the medical integrity of drug treatment programs.
Treatment for pregnant women does not generally differ greatly from that
offered to other clients; it is possible to identify in advance those women who
could not be treated safely without special provisions, such as on-site
obstetrical care. Fear of tort liability is unsupported by both the facts and the
321. Notably, a comparable standard to the one proposed in this article was accepted by the Supreme
Court in the context of a BFOQ defense for age discrimination. In Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400 (1985), the Court examined the BFOQ defense under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
which offers a parallel analysis to that under Title VII. See id. at 416. In adopting the lower court's
standard, the Court first put forth a "necessary" prong, requiring that "[tihe job qualifications which the
employer invokes to justify his discrimination must be reasonably necessary to the essence of his business."
Id. at 413. The Court went on to explain that discrimination is only reasonably necessary where "the
employer is compelled to rely on age as a proxy for the safety-related job qualifications validated in the
first inquiry." Id. at 414. An employer may establish this contention through two means. First, "[tihe
employer could establish that it 'had reasonable cause to believe, that is, factual basis for believing, that
all or substantially all [persons over the age qualifications] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved.'" Id. (quoting Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235
(5th Cir. 1976)). In the alternative, the employer could show that facially discriminating on the basis of
age is necessary because it is "'impossible or highly impractical' to deal with the older employees on an
individualized basis." Id. (quoting Usery, 531 F.2d at 235).
322. See, e.g., Wood v. Hogan, 215 F. Supp. 53, 55-56 (W.D. Va. 1963).
323. See Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp. Inc., 580 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1992).
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law. This section will focus primarily on medical justifications, with a shorter
review of the fear of liability defense, since medical justifications are more
likely to be asserted in court.
1. Medical Defenses
Medical justifications put forth by treatment programs for excluding
pregnant women may include concerns about the inappropriateness of a
particular treatment approach for pregnant women and the unavailability of
needed medical services (such as on-site obstetrical care)24 Although the
delivery of safe and appropriate treatment and the provision of ancillary
medical services qualify as fundamental objectives under the first prong of the
standard, the blanket exclusion of pregnant women is not necessary to meet
these goals. Admitting pregnant women into drug treatment does not generally
jeopardize the health and safety of the women or their fetuses, nor does it
require full-time on-site obstetrical services. While there may be some
exceptions to these propositions, they do not justify blanket exclusions.
Individualized analyses of patients would provide a reasonable alternative,
allowing treatment programs to identify those pregnant women who could not
be safely treated.
In most cases, drug treatment approaches for pregnant women do not differ
greatly from those for other clients. Detoxification, "therapeutically supervised
withdrawal to abstinence over a short term, "3"s is usually the first stage of
treatment,3 6 and it may last for up to twenty-one days. 27 Except in cases
of heroin addiction, pregnant women may safely undergo drug-free
detoxification.328 Although some researchers recommend hospitalization for
pregnant women undergoing detoxification,3 9  the need for medical
supervision can generally be met if a non-hospital-based detoxification program
provides hospital-based back-up care.330 After detoxification, or as a first
324. This analysis may be more crucial than that concerning fear of liability, because programs may
be more likely to focus on medical justifications rather than admit to worries about liability. See, e.g.,
Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp. Inc., 613 N.E.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. 1993) (defendant hospital
justified exclusion based on insufficient medical facilities and staff).
325. TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 16.
326. Heroin addiction presents a separate problem because methadone detoxification is not
recommended for pregnant women. See Michelle H. Allen, Detoxification Considerations in the Medical
Management of SubstanceAbuse in Pregnancy, 67 BuLL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 270, 273-74 (1991). Pregnant
women, however, may safely undergo methadone maintenance. For a fuller discussion of methadone
maintenance, in contrast to detoxification, see infra notes 338-45 and accompanying text.
327. Allen, supra note 326, at 274.
328. For example, acupuncture may be used for cocaine detoxification. See id. at 275.
329. See id.
330. Telephone Interview with Michael Harle, Director of Gaudenzia (Jan. 6, 1993). Many hospitals
providing back-up care would have obstetrical and gynecological services available. However, it is
important to note that not all hospitals offer such services. For example, some community-based facilities
specialize in providing certain types of care, which may lead to the elimination of obstetrical and
gynecological services. These institutions deny substance abuse treatment to pregnant women at their own
facilities. See, e.g., Hearing before Philadelphia Comm'n on Human Relations (Jan. 10, 1994) (prepared
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step if detoxification is not recommended, a patient enters a longer-term
treatment program. Among pregnant women living in the inner city, treatment
for cocaine addiction is most in demand. 3 ' "The prevailing model employed
for the treatment of cocaine/crack addiction is a psychotherapeutic one. "332
Because treatment for cocaine addiction is drug-free, the care of pregnant
women does not present particular treatment-related problems.333 Pregnant
cocaine-addicted women can be accommodated in the variety of drug-free
programs without endangering their health or creating significant costs.
334
Research shows that therapeutic communities 3 5 can be successful in
treating women, and that addicted mothers may benefit from such
programs.3 36  While men and women show similar outcomes, women
especially benefit because they usually enter with lower self-esteem.
"Influenced by socially conditioned perceptions and value judgments
concerning female role expectations, women accept (or internalize) the
conventional view that their drug use is 'sicker' or more deviant than that of
males. They express more depression, anxiety, and guilt in relation to their
drug abuse than do men. "33 ' These drug-free environments can provide
successful and healthy treatment for pregnant cocaine-addicted women.
Concern about safely treating pregnant women will not justify excluding them
from therapeutic communities.
In contrast to the drug-free treatment approach for cocaine addiction,
treatment for heroin addicts generally involves the use of methadone.
statement of Joseph V. Pettinati, Vice President of Psychiatry and Substance Abuse Service, Mt. Sinai
Hospital) (manuscript on file with the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism).
331. See Sandra McCalla et al., The Biological and Social Consequences of Perinatal Cocaine Use
in an Inner-city Population: Results of an Anonymous Cross-sectional Study, 164 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 625 (1991). It is important to note, however, that many cocaine addicts engage in multiple
drug abuse. See Sandra G. Boodman, Treating Cocaine Addicts: Why It's So Tough, WASH. POST, Nov.
28, 1989, at Z12. Therefore, while the following discussion addresses each addiction separately, in practice
programs must combine approaches.
332. Chavkin, supra note 22, at 485.
333. Although the treatment approach itself does not differ, pregnant women will need prenatal care
and other related services. These needs can be safely provided to most clients in treatment. See infra notes
347-54 and accompanying text.
334. Common methods of drug-free cocaine treatment include: twenty-eight-day inpatient rehabilitation
programs, which provide detoxification and individual and group therapy; twelve-step programs, such as
Narcotics Anonymous, which are so successful that they also are usually used as an ancillary part of any
other type of treatment; therapeutic communities (TCs), which utilize a supportive but highly structured
program to secure behavioral changes; and acupuncture, which many addicts say helps them relax and
reduces their craving for cocaine. See Boodman, supra note 331, at Z12, Z14.
335. "TC programs are highly structured blends of resocialization, milieu therapy, behavioral
modification practices, progression through a hierarchy of occupational training and responsibility within
the TC, community reentry, and a variety of social services." TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS, supra note 6,
at 14.
336. See George De Leon & Nancy Jainchill, Residential Therapeutic Communities for Female
Substance Abusers, 67 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 277, 279-81 (1991). However, these studies looked
primarily at heroine users, and recidivism generally is a greater problem among cocaine users than among
heroin addicts because patients cannot be offered a substitute. See Louis G. Keith et al., Drug Abuse in
Pregnancy, in DRUGS, ALCOHOL, PREGNANCY AND PARENTING 17, 43 (Ira J. Chasnoff ed., 1988) (noting
study that demonstrated that only one-third of cocaine addicts were able to maintain a drug-free state).
337. De Leon & Jainchill, supra note 336, at 282.
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Methadone was first used to treat heroin addiction in 1965 and was first tested
on pregnant women in 1969.338 In the early 1970's, the Food and Drug
Administration suggested methadone maintenance for pregnant
heroin-dependent women, but quickly withdrew that recommendation.339 At
the same time, the medical literature revealed some dangers to the fetus from
methadone maintenance, warnings about the need for careful monitoring and
debates about appropriate methadone dosages."
The medical community has overcome somewhat its reluctance to prescribe
methadone maintenance for pregnant heroin addicts as research has shown that
maintenance at low levels during pregnancy does not adversely affect birth
outcomes. 341 Because high dosages of methadone are associated with neonate
mortality and morbidity, most clinicians prescribe a low daily dose of 20 mg
or less.342 At this low dosage level, "the neonate will have an easily treatable
withdrawal syndrome, although many neonates of mothers maintained on such
low doses frequently do not require any specific pharmacological
treatment. "343 The only complication that may occur in the newborn from
maternal methadone maintenance is temporary opiate withdrawal
syndrome. 3' Therefore, pregnant heroin addicts can be safely treated in a
manner similar to nonpregnant addicts, disallowing any targeted exclusion of
pregnant women.345
338. See Keith et al., supra note 336, at 39. In treating pregnant heroin-addicted women, the main
goals are to avoid "cyclic craving" and sudden withdrawal. Methadone creates a stable environment for
the fetus, decreases maternal complications and improves pregnancy outcomes. See id. at 41.
339. See Chavkin, supra note 22, at 485.
340. See id. In addition to the specific debate about methadone maintenance for pregnant women, the
general use of methadone to treat heroin addiction remains somewhat controversial. Some have opposed
methadone treatment because methadone itself is addictive. See JOHN KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG:
HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 219 (1983). Supporters of methadone maintenance acknowledge its addictive
quality but believe this should not automatically lead to its disqualification as a form of treatment. "The
fact that methadone maintenance is not a cure for addiction should not be determinative so long as it
improves the addict's life and health and lowers the cost he imposes on society." Id.
341. See MANUAL OF DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE: GUIDELINES FOR TEACHING IN MEDICAL AND
HEALTH INSTITUTIONS 206-207 (Awni Arif & Joseph Westermeyer eds., 1988) [hereinafter MANUAL OF
DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE]; Loretta P. Finnegan et al., Narcotic Addiction in Pregnancy, in DRUG USE
IN PREGNANCY 163, 171 (Jennifer R. Niebyl ed., 1982); Keith et al., supra note 336, at 40, 42. Evidence
exists showing pregnancy outcomes are better for women in methadone maintenance programs than for
heroin or methadone addicts not in treatment. These outcomes are thought to reflect improved lifestyle and
medical care as well as access to services associated with the maintenance programs. Chavkin, supra note
22, at 485.
342. See MANUAL OF DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE, supra note 341, at 206.
343. Id.
344. See Finnegan et al., supra note 58, at 230. Methadone detoxification, however, is not
recommended for pregnant women. See supra note 326. Sudden withdrawal from heroin or methadone
creates a significant risk of fetal death. See MANUAL OF DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE, supra note 341, at
206.
345. Such exclusions are especially problematic because methadone maintenance also should be used
with caution when treating other types of clients, such as those with pre-existing respiratory disorders. See
EDWARD R. BARNHART, PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1927 (45th ed. 1991) (noting that overdosage of
methadone may be characterized by respiratory depression, i.e. a decrease in the respiratory rate, thus the
need for special caution in treating individuals with pre-existing respiratory conditions). Despite the
similarity in treatment precautions, however, these other clients are not barred by the exclusionary policies
that target pregnant women.
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In addition to concerns regarding general treatment approaches, 346
ADAMHA defendants, particularly residential programs, also may claim that
their blanket exclusions of pregnant women are justified due to the
unavailability of on-site obstetrical care. A court should not sustain this claim.
A treatment program can rely on off-site obstetrical care, just as other types
of medical services are provided to clients with specific concerns.347 Off-site
obstetrical care does not present a danger to pregnant women in drug
treatment.
If the pregnant woman has complications when she is at home, she
either calls her doctor or goes to the emergency room or goes to the
hospital. There is no reason to believe... [that] a residential program
would not be able to handle that person in the exact same fashion as
somebody who is at home or any other facility in the workplace. The
facility would be able to call, make arrangements to have her provider
notified, and then the patient could be evaluated in that program.348
As part of this analysis, it is important to note that the need for emergency
services, for example due to premature labor, generally is eliminated when a
pregnant woman stops using drugs.349 Obstetrical care for pregnant women
in drug treatment does not differ from that provided to other pregnant women.
Several clinics have demonstrated the feasibility of providing pregnant
women with the care they need. 350 These programs underline the weaknesses
of medical justifications for excluding pregnant women from drug treatment
programs. For example, Gaudenzia in Philadelphia has admitted pregnant
women since it opened its doors in 1968.35' The program's director
explained: "It is my professional opinion that there are no valid reasons for
346. Another concern regarding the appropriateness of certain drug treatment programs for pregnant
women focuses on the rigor of the treatment schedule. Such a concern does not justify exclusion of pregnant
women. As one expert explained,
[Pregnant] women are able to carry on their lives when they are not drug dependent. They are
allowed to work. They are allowed to shop. They are allowed to do everything that they do any
other time. And there is no reason to think that the schedule that is required in a residential
program or in an outpatient program would adversely affect that pregnancy. In fact, the fact that
she is getting treatment for her drug addiction will impact positively on the pregnancy ....
Statement of Dr. Arnold Cohen, supra note 32, at 142.
347. For example, Genesis II, a drug treatment program in Philadelphia that accepts pregnant women,
utilizes off-site providers of prenatal care. Clients with medical coverage may select the provider of their
choice; uninsured clients are sent to a free clinic. All pregnant clients enter prenatal care within their first
week in the program. Clients with HIV, or other conditions identified in the initial physical examination,
are presented with similar options for ancillary care. Telephone Interview with Shelita Swinton, Residential
Coordinator, Genesis II (Mar. 10, 1994).
348. Statement of Dr. Arnold Cohen, supra note 32, at 148.
349. Id.
350. These clinics include: Pregnant Addicts-Addicted Mothers in New York City; the Eleanor Hutzel
Hospital program in Detroit; and Center of Care in California. Kandall & Chavkin, supra note 93, at 642.
351. See Affidavit of Michael Harle, Director of Gaudenzia, in Letter from Women's Law Project
to Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, Exhibit B, 3 (Sept. 4, 1992) (seeking an investigation
of pregnancy discrimination by substance abuse treatment programs in Philadelphia).
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a qualified treatment program, with a well-trained staff, to deny access to
pregnant women and such denial of access is largely based on ignorance and
fear."352 He acknowledged that pregnant drug-addicted women are high-risk
patients, but added that, "every drug addict is a high risk patient."' Thus,
it is important to "look at each individual.., and not just turn down a woman
because she is pregnant. "354
Individualized intake assessments of pregnant women are medically and
fiscally possible. In fact, treatment programs that accept pregnant women
generally require such examinations. These assessments enable a program to
identify a woman's ancillary obstetrical needs. They also ensure that an
individual woman who could not be safely treated at a facility without on-site
care would not be admitted. While there is the concern that a pregnant woman
who could not be safely treated with only off-site obstetrical services may not
be properly identified, individual evaluations should enable programs to
identify problem cases in advance. Further, there are few, if any, instances
when this would occur.
355
Under the proposed standard, individual assessments would be required by
ADAMHA as a reasonable alternative to blanket exclusions. Drug treatment
programs that utilize blanket exclusions instead of individual assessments would
be required to restructure their intake procedures. This standard may be more
stringent than that put forth by the New York Court of Appeals in Elaine W
The Elaine W court held that blanket exclusions were permissible where a
defendant "cannot, prior to admission, identify with reasonable medical
certainty those women who might receive treatment without needing
immediate, on-site obstetrical services."356 The court does not elaborate on
the meaning of "cannot." The court's standard may evaluate only a program's
present ability to make an individualized determination; it may not require a
program to alter its procedures or enhance its resources in order to make such
distinctions possible, as does the standard proposed by this Article.
The preceding analysis suggests that drug treatment for most pregnant
women does not differ dramatically from programs for non-pregnant addicts.
While pregnant clients require some services that nonpregnant clients do not,
and some individual pregnant clients may require significant medical
accommodations, substantial treatment modifications generally are not required.
Further, the obstetrical needs of pregnant women throughout the period of drug
treatment usually can be met through part-time services or arrangements with
outside providers. In cases where these generalizations do not apply, individual
assessments provide a targeted method of identifying clients who could not be
352. Id. at 14.
353. Telephone Interview with Michael Harle, Director, Gaudenzia (Jan. 6, 1993).
354. Id.
355. Telephone Interview with Ruth Banks, Director, Women's World Program, in Philadelphia, PA
(Mar. 16, 1994).
356. Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 613 N.E.2d 523, 525 (N.Y. 1993).
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safely treated. Blanket exclusions are not necessary to satisfy the fundamental
objectives of drug treatment programs. Medical justifications for excluding
pregnant women from drug treatment, whether based on medical costs or fear
of harming a woman or her fetus, will not stand up in court.
2. Fear of Liability
Fear of tort liability lies at the root of pregnancy discrimination by some
drug treatment programs,3" 7 although it may be masked by more publicly
acceptable medical justifications. While Johnson Controls seems to indicate
that such fears would not be an acceptable defense to pregnancy
discrimination,"' the widespread nature of this concern warrants a brief
discussion of the argument's merits.
Although treatment programs may fear liability for damage to the fetus,
such fear is not well-founded. First, there is little chance that such suits would
be brought. One study showed that state drug treatment officials did not believe
that liability was "a legitimate concern" of treatment programs; government
authorities did not find any increase in lawsuits or insurance costs connected
with the treatment of pregnant drug-dependent women."5 9 This finding likely
is due to the fact that if a woman who used drugs during pregnancy brought
such an action, she would face significant hurdles regarding the merits of her
claim.360
Further, if a plaintiff (either the woman herself or the child) brought a tort
action, the defendant's liability would be severely limited. As part of proving
her prima facie case, the plaintiff initially would have to demonstrate that the
defendant was a cause in fact and a proximate cause of the harm to her
fetus.36' Showing that a treatment provider caused fetal harm might be
difficult due to proof problems created by the mother's use of drugs during
her pregnancy.362
357. See HUMAN REsoURcEs DIVISION, UNITED STATES GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-HRD-
91-80, ADMS BLOCK GRANT: WOMEN'S SET-ASIDE DOES NOT ASSURE DRUG TREATMENT FOR PREGNANT
WOMEN 18 (1991) [hereinafter "HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION, ADMS"].
358. See supra note 309 and accompanying text. The Court's reasoning, in fact, provides a possible
defense to tort suits. See infra note 364 and accompanying text.
359. See HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION, ADMS, supra note 357, at 18. These officials noted that
invoking fear of liability "was more likely a justification that providers used for turning away pregnant
women because the providers were unequipped to, or uninterested in, meeting the needs of these women."
Id.
360. Telephone Interview with Susan Jacobs, Legal Action Center (Jan. 11, 1993). A group of medical
malpractice lawyers in New York are working with plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys to promote an
understanding of why suits against clinics would not be productive. The group notes that such medical
malpractice suits are problematic because the woman herself may be a weak plaintiff since she was using
drugs during her pregnancy. Id. Also, in actions on behalf of the child, the mother could be joined as a
defendant since she will not be able to claim parent-child immunity. J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL,
MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & LITIGATION § 18.09 at 643-44 (1988).
361. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 269 (5th
ed. 1984).
362. Telephone Interview with Susan Jacobs, Legal Action Center (Jan. 11, 1993).
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If the plaintiff satisfied this requirement, however, she still would have to
show that the treatment provider acted unreasonably according to the prevailing
standards of the profession.363 As long as a drug treatment program acts
reasonably-receiving approval from a pregnant woman's prenatal care
provider and advising the woman about what tasks she should not
undertake-the risk of taking in a pregnant client would not differ significantly
from that of treating any other client. Of course, a treatment provider could
still be liable for negligent provision of services, but this is true whether or
not pregnant women are accepted for drug treatment.
In response to a finding of negligence, a defendant would be able to raise
an affirmative defense. Following Johnson Controls, a defendant could claim
that the federal ADAMHA statute shields it from liability. As the Johnson
Controls Court explained, compliance with a federal statute will generally




Fear of liability, then, is not a viable affirmative defense for discriminating
against pregnant women in drug treatment programs. Such clients are unlikely
to bring suits. Even if such suits were brought, defendants would only be liable
for acting unreasonably where the plaintiff could demonstrate actual and
proximate causation of the fetal harm in question. Defendants would also be
able to avail themselves of an affirmative defense. Accordingly, liability does
not threaten the fundamental objectives of providing safe treatment or
financially maintaining a treatment program and therefore cannot justify
discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The ADAMHA Reorganization Act plays a vital role in addressing the
current problem of drug addiction among pregnant women. The
nondiscrimination provision offers particular assistance by allowing pregnant
women access to the maximum number of facilities. Pregnant women may
enforce their rights under the nondiscrimination provision itself and under
§ 1983, although the remedies will vary under each statute. Further, treatment
programs will not be able to rely on medical justifications or fears of liability
to uphold blanket exclusions of pregnant women. Lawsuits under ADAMHA's
nondiscrimination provision are capable of opening up large numbers of
federally funded treatment slots, offering some hope for pregnant drug-addicted
women and their newborns.
363. KEETON ET AL., supra note 361, at 187.
364. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 209 (1991) ("When
it is impossible for an employer to comply with both state and federal requirements, this Court has ruled
that federal law pre-empts that of the states.").
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But ADAMHA does not offer treatment on demand. Nor does it eradicate
the social factors often connected to drug addiction. ADAMHA's
"anti-discrimination provision is [only] a device for telling legislatures,
governments and designated others what they may not do, thus setting
parameters within which they must operate. It does not, and cannot, do the
basic job of readjusting the social order. "365
365. Williams, supra note 41, at 374.
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